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Abstract
While economic voting has been analysed in detail in international studies, the
phenomenon has been under-studied in the Australian context. This dissertation
investigates the link between economic voting and the minor party vote in Australia by
analysing the vote share for One Nation in Queensland at the 2016 Senate election
and 2017 state election. Using linear regression, the relationship between income,
unemployment and the One Nation vote proves to be statistically significant, but the
relationship does not apply to areas with large populations of Indigenous people or
voters from non-English speaking backgrounds. This study offers broad insights into
the link between economic factors and minor party voting in Australia.
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Introduction
1.0

CONTEXT
In 2016, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party returned to federal parliament by

winning four seats in the Senate, ending a hiatus that began in 2005. This forms part
of a pattern of declining major party support that has been evident since 2007, with
almost one in four Australians having voted for a minor party or independent candidate
in the House of Representatives at the 2016 federal election.1 This has been to the
advantage of a wide diversity of parties on both right and left.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether economic voting models can
explain such surges in support for minor parties, by examining the pattern of support
for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in Queensland. The pattern of support for One
Nation, particularly in regional Queensland, suggests economic challenges may have
played a role in the growing disaffection with the major parties.
The focus on Queensland, where the party is particularly strong, reflects the
importance of regional political culture in explaining support for the party. However, it
will be argued that One Nation’s rise can serve as a case study for regional minor
parties in other states, of which there were two notable further examples at the 2016
election, both in states that had experienced significant economic challenges. One
was the Jacqui Lambie Network in Lambie’s home state of Tasmania, where she was
elected to the Senate with 8.3% of the vote. The other was in South Australia, where
the Nick Xenophon Team won three seats in the Senate and one in the House of
Representatives with 21.74% of the vote.2

1.1

TOPIC AND PURPOSE
The focus of this study is to determine if a significant relationship exists between

economic indicators, namely income, change in income (between the 2011 and 2016
censuses) and unemployment, and the level of electoral support for One Nation in
Clare Blumer, “Election Results: Here's How the 2016 Figures Stack up Historically,”
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, accessed 1 December 2017,
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-03/election-results-historical-comparison/7560888.
2 Australian Electoral Commission, 2019 Federal Election: State and Territory Results,
accessed 7 September 2021,
https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/SenateStateResultsMenu-24310.htm.
1
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Queensland. For this purpose, census data sourced from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics is used in conjunction with election results from the 2016 federal election
and the 2017 state election in Queensland, so that minor party voting can be
considered in two distinct political contexts. The federal study focuses on results for
the Senate, as One Nation only stood candidates in 15 of the 150 seats for the House
of Representatives.3
Central to this project is the reward-punishment model of voting behaviour, in
which voters either reward incumbent governments through re-election for good
economic management or punish them if their performance has been poor. This
outlook on voter behaviour was exemplified by the appeal of Ronald Reagan to US
voters during the 1980 presidential campaign:
Are you better off than you were four years ago? Is it easier for you to
go and buy things from the store than it was four years ago? Is there
more or less unemployment in the country than there was four years
ago? Is America as respected throughout the world as it was?4
The reward-punishment model, which originated in the US context, is usually
understood in terms of two-party competition. However, the ongoing decline in support
for the major parties suggests voters are increasingly seeking out minor parties to
“punish” the major parties collectively for economic policies pursued by both. In the
Australian context, such voters often appear to favour party leaders with a high
regional profile, contributing to a fragmentation of the minor party vote.
According to Hellwig and McAllister, economic voting effects have historically
been modest in Australia, due to factors including three-year election cycles,
compulsory voting, and a tendency not to assign responsibility for economic outcomes
to the federal government.5 Due to this weakness, studies of voter behaviour in
Australia have tended to emphasise long-term factors in vote choice, so that only

3

Australian Electoral Commission, 2019 Federal Election: House of Representatives
Candidates, accessed 7 September 2021,
https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseCandidates-24310.htm.
4 Commission on Presidential Debates, “The Carter-Reagan Presidential Debate,” accessed 1
December 2017, https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-281980-debate-transcript.
5 Timothy Hellwig and Ian McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter? Economic Perceptions
and the Vote in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2016): 237.
11

limited impact has been attributed to assessments of current economic conditions.
However, Leigh and Wolfers argue that more recent research using econometric
models has found stronger evidence for links between economic conditions and
electoral outcomes, with the models providing “useful forecasts, particularly when
making medium-term predictions.”6 This possibility challenges the existing view that
the impact of economic voting is relatively weak in Australia.

1.2

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
From the developments just noted, the following research problem has been

identified: The Australian political science literature has yet to account for the potential
of local economic circumstances to explain surges in support for minor parties. The
research questions for the thesis are as follows:

1. Can economic voting explain the motivations for right-wing minor party
voting in Australia?
2. Are economic motivations better explained by absolute measures of
economic well-being or change in economic status?
3. How does economic voting intersect with other voting factors?

1.3

SIGNIFICANCE
This project is significant because it contributes to the study of economic voting

at a time of observable change in Australian voting behaviour. While there have been
studies conducted into economic voting, it has not been discussed extensively in
relation to minor party voters. With the election of One Nation Senators at the 2016
federal election, it is important to contextualise whether the party’s revival was based
partly on economic grounds or entirely on cultural anxiety. A focus on One Nation’s
performance in 2016, as well as at the 2017 state election in Queensland, may
produce findings relevant to the general study of minor party voting, a factor of growing
importance in Australia.

Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, “Competing Approaches to Forecasting Elections:
Economic Models, Opinion Polling and Prediction Markets,” The Economic Record 82, no.
258 (2006): 326.
6
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1.4

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This section provides a thematic and integrative review of three strands of

literature relevant to this thesis. The first of these is international research into
economic voting, mostly from US sources. Here an emphasis is placed on the rewardpunishment model, which forms the theoretical framework of this study. The second
is Australian literature on economic voting, which is considered more broadly. The
third is minor party voting in Australia, and the new importance it has gained since the
2016 federal election.

1.4.2 Minor party voting in Australia
The surge in minor party voting reached historic heights at the 2016 election.
One Nation has been one of the few minor parties to have had success across multiple
decades.
This rise in support for an ideologically diverse range of minor parties reflects a
significant change in voter behaviour. Prior to the 1970s, successful minor parties
tended to be formed by breaking away from the existing major parties. The most
important example was the Democratic Labour Party, which was formed as an anticommunist party in the wake of the Labor split of 1955. On the other side of politics,
the Liberal Movement broke away from the Liberal Party in the early 1970s. It went on
to play a role in the foundation of the Australian Democrats, which was established by
Don Chipp, a former Liberal Party federal minister.7
Minor parties seeking to establish themselves from outside the existing major
system faced considerable obstacles. The single-member electorate system made it
difficult for new parties to compete with the major parties in the House of
Representatives, despite the possibilities offered by preferential voting. The Senate
offered minor parties better prospects after the PR-STV system was introduced in
1949, but was nonetheless largely dominated by the major parties until the 1980s.8

Zareh Ghazarian, “The Changing Type of Minor Party Elected to Parliament: The Case of
the Australian Senate from 1949 to 2010,” Australian Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3
(2012): 444.
8 Scott Brenton, “Policy Traps for Third Parties in Two Party Systems the Australian Case,”
Commonweath & Comparative Politics 51, no. 3 (2013), 289; John Uhr, “Why We Chose
Proportional Representation,” Parliament of Australia, accessed 1 August 2021,
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/pops/pop3
4/c02.
7
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This began to change with the growth of “issue-based” minor parties on the left
and right. This included the Australian Democrats, notwithstanding its roots in the
Liberal Party, along with the Nuclear Disarmament Party and later the Greens.9
There is also the concept of post-materialism, which relates to issues
concerning quality of life that are not monetary, such as the environment and human
rights,10 implying that economic assessments play little role in determining electoral
support for parties such as the Greens.
However, post-materialism does not explain the later emergence of parties of
the right including One Nation, whose values are at odds with those of the postmaterialists. This is reflected in their different electoral bases, with the Greens drawing
much of their support from young voters in inner urban areas and One Nation drawing
support largely from older voters in regional areas.11 According to the Australian
Election Study for the 2019 federal election, 28% of voters aged 18-34 voted for the
Greens and 9% voted for other minor parties including One Nation. By contrast, only
3% of those aged 55 and over voted for the Greens, with 11% voting for other minor
parties.12
Other parties of the centre and the right that have won Senate representation
have incorporated the name of a popular leader in their party name and drawn support
from specific states or regional areas, namely the Nick Xenophon Team in South
Australia, the Jacqui Lambie Network in Tasmania and Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party
in Victoria. Another example is Katter’s Australia Party, associated with Bob Katter,
the member for Queensland seat of Kennedy in the House of Representatives, which
also holds seats in the Queensland state parliament.
While One Nation has achieved wider recognition and success than many of
these parties, it remains notable for its strength in Queensland, where it won two
Senate seats in 2016 compared with one each in New South Wales and Western
Ghazarian, “The Changing Type of Minor Party Elected to Parliament,” 445-447.
Stewart Jackson, The Australian Greens: From Activism to Australia's Third Party
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), 173-174.
11 Paul Reynolds, “One Nation’s Electoral Support in Queensland: The 1998 State and
Federal Elections Compared,” in The Rise and Fall of One Nation, ed. Michael Leach,
Geoffrey Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 153-169.
12
Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, “The 2019 Australian Federal Election: Results from
the Australian Election Study,” Australian National University, accessed 3 February 2020.
http://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-ElectionResults-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf
9
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Australia and none in the other three states, or the two territories. While this reflects
the fact that Queensland is home to the party’s founder, Pauline Hanson, Glenn
Kefford has argued that the state is fertile ground for anti-establishment and anti-major
party sentiment generally, with an established record of support for minor parties and
independents above the national average.13
However, support for One Nation is not evenly distributed throughout
Queensland, and research suggests the variation can at least partly be explained by
economic factors. Goot and Watson studied the reasons people voted One Nation
when the party first emerged in 1998, and noted the party drew much of its support
from blue-collar voters in areas with higher unemployment than the national average,
who held negative views about the state of the economy.14 Significantly, many One
Nation voters believed neither the Liberal Party nor the Australian Labor Party had
worked hard enough to tackle economic problems such as unemployment.15
The influence of economic as opposed to cultural factors in explaining One
Nation support has been widely debated. In an essay on Pauline Hanson entitled The
White Queen, David Marr argued One Nation voters were motivated mainly by cultural
anxiety, particularly a perceived loss of status and fear of immigration.16 Similarly, a
paper by Mols and Jetten argued that income was a poor predictor of the One Nation
vote, given that One Nation had thrived even though economic conditions in Australia
have been relatively good.17
Despite this, Marr cited Australian Electoral Study survey data that suggested
One Nation voters were more likely to feel pessimistic about the Australian economy
and negative about their personal financial situation.18 The 2016 surge in support for
the party has also been linked to economic problems in regional Queensland, where
support for the party is strongest. These were noted in a report in The Monthly after
the 2019 federal election, which examined the impact of a mining downturn on the
Glenn Kefford, “The Minor Parties’ Campaigns,” in Double Disillusion: The 2016
Australian Federal Election, ed. Anika Gauja, et al. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2018): 343.
14 Murray Goot and Ian Watson, “Where Does It Come From, What Makes It Different and
How Does It Fit?” Australian Journal of Politics and History 47, no. 2 (2001): 160-162.
15 Goot and Watson, 166.
16 David Marr, “The White Queen: One Nation and the Politics of Race,” The Quarterly
Essay 65, 2017: 53
17 Frank Mols and Jolanda Jetten, “One Nation’s Support: Why ‘Income’ Is a Poor
Predictor,” Australasian Parliamentary Review 32, no. 1 (2017): 93.
18 Mols and Jetten, 96.
13
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electorate of Dawson, covering the area of Mackay in the state’s north. The report said
nearly one-third of adults had either no work or not enough, with many former miners
selling cars and jet skis for quick money.19 Based on the previous research covered in
this section of the literature review, there needs to be further investigation in modern
minor party voting, particularly right-wing parties. Where there has been analysis on
the rise of One Nation, the focus has on been on the 1998 – 2001 period.
A previous study in the subject was conducted by Damon Alexander on the
1998 – 2001 era of One Nation. Alexander notes the party's demographic basis of
support. These consistently found effects for race/immigration and rural location.20
Overall, he found that the aggregate level studies consistently found that electorates
with local income and high unemployment had greater support for One Nation. This
thesis aims to use a similar method of aggregate-based analysis to study the affiliation
between economic factors and support for One Nation. However, Alexander also cited
that “Aggregate-based studies, for example, have tended to accentuate the impact of
socio-economic factors, such as income, class and unemployment. Whereas
individual-level studies have often emphasised the role of attitudinal factors.”21 Given
the 15-year absence between 2001 and 2016, the aim of this thesis is study whether
more recent factors (at the time of the 2016 election) contributed to the return of One
Nation, driving support from the outer metropolitan area, regional towns and rural
areas.

1.4.3 International context: economic voting and elections
This section of the literature review refers to studies from the US. It is
acknowledged that there are differences in the electoral system and political culture
between the United States and Australia. While the US studies into economic voting
were conducted within the context of its rigid two-party system, this thesis proposes
that the principle of the reward-punishment model can be applied in the Australian
context to explain the surge in support for minor parties including One Nation in 2016.
The reward-punishment model assumes voters either reward or punish incumbents

Lech Blaine, “How Good Is Queensland?,” The Monthly 161, 2019, 20-33.
Damon Alexander, “Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the Far Right Tradition in
Australia” (PhD thesis, Monash University, 2006): 274.
21 Alexander, 233.
19
20
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depending on the state of the economy.22 Beyond the United States literature, the
model has been found to be of relevance to elections in Europe, with a study finding
both economic growth and inequality had impacts on election results.23
The US research into economic voting has drawn a distinction between
“pocketbook” and “sociotropic” effects on voter behaviour. Pocketbook voting refers to
vote choice based on assessment of the voter’s personal financial situation.
Sociotropic voting is based on how the government is perceived to have managed the
broader macroeconomic situation.24 While research has found support for both effects,
the evidence for sociotropic voting appears stronger. This suggests economic voting
effects are likely to be strongest where voters perceive a deterioration in their own
communities, and thus to be evident by comparing regional economic data and
election results.
The significance of sociotropic voting in the United States was established by
results of the American National Election Studies surveys. According to Kiewiet and
Lewis-Beck, this data showed voters were “strongly influenced by their assessments
of how the nation’s economy had been performing”. Even if a voter’s own financial
situation had deteriorated, they “tended to support the incumbent party when they
believed that the US economy had been doing well.”25 A study by Robert Grafstein
explored the “puzzle of weak pocketbook voting,” and found sociotropic assessments
had more influence because they gave voters a better guide for long-term
partisanship.26
Studies that have found a role for pocketbook voting have tended to do so
without downplaying the importance of sociotropic factors. A study by Healy, Persson
and Snowberg found pocketbook evaluations contained “real information about

Dieter Stiers, “Static and Dynamic Models of Retrospective Voting: A Clarification and
Application to the Individual Level,” Politics & Policy 47, no. 5 (2019): 861.
23 Ruth Dassonneville and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, “Inequality and Party Support: Positional
Economic Voting or a New Dimension of Valence?,” Regional Studies 54, no. 7 (2020), 900.
24 Bryan J. Dettrey, “Relative Losses and Economic Voting: Sociotropic Considerations or
‘Keeping up with the Joneses?’,” Politics & Policy 41, no. 5 (2013): 789.
25
D. Roderick Kiewiet and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, “No Man Is an Island: Self-Interest, the
Public Interest and Sociotropic Voting,” Critical Review 23, no. 3 (2011): 303-304.
26 Robert Grafstein, “The Puzzle of Weak Pocketbook Voting,” Journal of Theoretical
Politics 21, no. 4 (2009): 451
22
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economic experiences,”27 concluding that “voters who appear in survey data to be
voting based on the national economy are, in fact, voting equally on the basis of their
personal financial conditions.”28 This provides further support for the contention that
economic voting effects are likely to be strongest in communities where the economy
has performed poorly.

1.4.2 Australian context: economic voting
The political science literature in Australia has traditionally attributed limited
impact to economic voting, whether pocketbook or sociotropic. Discussing Australian
research into voter behaviour up to 2013, Hellwig and McAllister describe the apparent
weakness of economic effects in Australia as “a paradox in international research on
economic voting”:
On the one hand, it is an established democracy with stable
institutions, a two-party system and a sophisticated electorate. For
these reasons, the comparative politics literature would predict a
strong and robust economics-election connection for Australia. 29
Hellwig and McAllister offered three sets of explanations for the seemingly
limited effect of economic conditions on election outcomes in Australia. The first were
institutional factors including a three-year electoral cycle, which could lead voters to
think government policies had not had time to take effect, and compulsory voting,
which meant those who had not made detailed evaluations of the government’s
economic performance were nonetheless required to vote. The second set relates to
party identification, which is unusually strong in Australia, and has been shown to have
an inverse relationship with economic voting. The third set involves assignment of
responsibility for policy outcomes. Voters in Australia may not hold the federal
government responsible for the state of the economy, due to “Australia’s relatively
small size, and interdependence with the global economy.” 30

Andrew Healy, Mikael Persson, and Erik Snowberg, “Digging into the Pocketbook:
Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey,”
American Political Science Review 4, no. 111 (2017): 783.
28 Healy, Persson and Snowberg, “Digging into the Pocketbook,” 771.
29 Hellwig and McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter?,” 248-9.
30 Hellwig and McAllister, 238.
27
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Researchers into voter behaviour in Australia accordingly emphasised the party
identification model, which proposes that voters form attachments to a major political
party early in life. The voter only goes against their party of identification in exceptional
circumstances, and usually returns to it at the following election. This model was used
to explain the stability that was evident in early studies of voter behaviour in the United
States in the 1940s and 1950s.31
The importance of party identification was reiterated by Ian McAllister in his
2011 book, The Australian Voter: 50 Years of Change, which analysed voter behaviour
using variables including education levels, union membership and religion. While
McAllister argued that parental socialisation effects had somewhat declined, he
affirmed that long-term voting trends still showed a “remarkably high degree of
stability.”32 However, the rise of minor party voting over the three federal elections
since the book’s publication has called into question this stability and the relevance of
the party identification model. The gaps identified in this literature review point to the
need for closer analysis around economic voting for right-wing minor parties in
Australia.

1.5

METHODS AND METHODLOGY
To consider the research questions of this thesis, it is necessary to examine

the relationship between economic factors and voter support for One Nation. A dataset
has been produced containing Australian Bureau of Statistics census data from 2011
and 2016 and election results at the polling booth level, derived from the Australian
Electoral Commission and the Electoral Commission of Queensland. These are
matched by using census data from the Statistical Area Level 1 (SA1) in which the
polling booths are located.33
Linear regression analysis is used to measure the relationship between One
Nation’s share of the vote – the dependent variable – and independent variables
relevant to the study of economic voting effects. This produces coefficients which, if

31

Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
Ian McAllister, The Australian Voter: 50 Years of Change (Sydney: University of New
South Wales Press, 2011): 49.
33 I am indebted to the election analyst, William Bowe, for providing me with the polling
place data matched to the local census results.
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significant, allow for estimation of the One Nation vote based on the value of the
independent variables.

The variables used are:
•

Dependent variable: percentage vote for One Nation at the 2016 federal
election for the Senate, and the 2017 state election in Queensland;

•

Economic variables (independent): income, unemployment, change in
income between 2011 and 2016;

•

Non-economic

variables

(independent):

English

spoken

only

and

percentage of Indigenous population;
•

Dummy variables (independent): State variables (for federal election
analysis only) and metropolitan/regional variable (for both federal and state
elections).

The inclusion of an English language variable allows for measurement of the
clear tendency for One Nation to receive their strongest support from voters of AngloCeltic origin, in recognition of the fact that economic factors can offer only a partial
explanation for the party’s overall support. A variable for the Indigenous population
was also included after it was noted that One Nation achieved minimal support in lowincome Indigenous communities. The dummy variables allow for measurement of
effects at state level, such as the strong support for the party in Queensland. Similarly,
the metropolitan/regional variable provides a measure of the tendency for the party to
receive more votes in regional areas. These serve as control variables, so that the
coefficients measure the effects of the economic variables independently of the other
factors included in the model.

1.6

LIMITATIONS
Survey data is an ideal source for investigating individual voting behaviour.

However, existing sources of data such as the Australian Election Study series provide
only very small samples of respondents who voted for One Nation, and large-scale
independent interviews are not feasible for a Masters project. The study is thus based
on election and census data from the lowest level for which data is available: election
results at the polling place level, and census data from Statistical Area Level 1 (SA1),
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which the Australian Bureau of Statistics uses to combine areas of around 400
residents.34 While care must still be taken in drawing inferences about individual
behaviour, a study at this level provides a strong basis for considering the research
questions central to this thesis.
In focusing on One Nation, the study also offers only a limited perspective on
the rise of minor party voting. This is relevant not only to “post-materialist” parties such
as the Greens, but also to arguably populist parties such as the Nick Xenophon Team,
Jacqui Lambie Network and Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party. These parties have
achieved Senate representation in the past decade but have not had the antiimmigration focus of One Nation.
A further limitation is that the project does not examine every aspect that
motivates people to vote for minor parties, as the focus is on economic factors.
Chapter two of this study examines non-economic reasons for voting for One Nation,
but the statistical analysis of them is limited to control variables for linguistic factors,
the Indigenous population and state and regional factors.

1.7

THESIS CHAPTERS
Chapter one focuses on the different reasons people may vote for minor parties

in the Australian context. Those examined include protest voting, cultural anxiety,
ideology and charismatic leadership.
Chapter two examines the initial rise of One Nation, particularly at the 1998
Queensland state election, to provide context for the main case study focusing on the
party’s return to prominence at the 2016 federal and 2017 Queensland state elections.
The third chapter examines different models of voting behaviour with an
emphasis on economic voting, including consideration of the distinction between
pocketbook and sociotropic effects. However, relevant alternative models of voting
behaviour, including party identification and class voting, are also addressed.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS):
Volume 1 - Main Structure and Greater Capital City Statistical Areas, July 2016,” accessed 8
Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS): Volume
1 - Main Structure and Greater Capital City Statistical Areas, July 2016,” accessed 8
December 2019.
https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1270.0.55.001~July%2020
16~Main%20Features~Statistical%20Area%20Level%201%20(SA1)~10013.
34

21

Chapter four analyses election and census data using linear regression to
establish whether economic voting was a statistically significant factor in support for
One Nation.
The fifth chapter integrates the findings of the research into the literature on
economic voting and minor party voting in Australia. This includes an examination of
the key findings, acknowledgement of the limitations of this study and
recommendations for further research.

1.8

CONCLUSION
Based on the above literature review, the 2016 election results provide an

opportunity to reconsider the impact of economic voting in Australia. Although past
research has indicated economic voting to be of limited value in explaining voter
behaviour in Australia due to strong partisanship and the overall good health of the
Australian economy, it is necessary to revisit these findings considering the
unprecedented growth in minor party voting over the past decade. The results of this
research will also offer valuable insights into the extent to which populist politics in
Australia can be best understood in terms of economic or cultural factors.
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Chapter One: Minor Party Voting in Australia
2.0

INTRODUCTION
The first chapter of this thesis reviews potential reasons for minor party voting,

including protest voting against the two-party system, adherence to ideologies outside
the political mainstream, support for charismatic leaders and – significantly for the
economic voting thesis – issues of local concern. In Australia, the rise in minor party
voting since 2010 has been especially important in the Senate, where a proportional
representation electoral system gives minor parties greater opportunities than the
House of Representatives to win seats. This has occurred at a time of instability in the
major parties, which have experienced frequent leadership challenges and changes
of prime ministership.1

Figure 1: Rise in minor party voting in Senate, 2004-2019
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Rodney Tiffen, Disposable Leaders: Media and Leadership Coups from Menzies to Abbott
(NewSouth Publishing, 2017): 1-3.

2.1

THE RISE OF MINOR PARTY VOTING IN THE SENATE
The increase in minor party voting at Australian Senate elections is illustrated

in Figure 1, which includes a combined result for parties other than the Coalition, Labor
and the Greens. This records a peak in 2016, followed by a slight fall in 2019. The rise
in minor party voting has taken different forms in different states, as illustrated by Table
1, which records each case of a minor party’s Senate vote exceeding 4% in each state
since 2013. While One Nation and the Palmer United Party achieved success across
multiple states, both recorded their greatest support in Queensland. Other parties in
the table, notably the Nick Xenophon Group, Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party and Jacqui
Lambie Network, recorded significant levels of support only in their home states.

Table 1: Minor party primary votes 2013-2019 (Senate)

Party
Liberal Democrats
Nick Xenophon Group
Palmer United Party
Palmer United Party
Palmer United Party
Derryn Hinch's Justice Party
One Nation
One Nation
Nick Xenophon Team
Jacqui Lambie Network
One Nation
One Nation
One Nation
Jacqui Lambie Network

2.2

State
NSW
SA
Tas
Qld
WA
Vic
Qld
WA
SA
Tas
NSW
WA
SA
Tas

Election n
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2019
2019
2019
2019

Senate Vote
9.5%
24.9%
6.6%
9.9%
5.0%
6.0%
9.2%
4.0%
21.7%
8.3%
5.0%
5.9%
4.9%
8.9%

THEORIES OF MINOR PARTY VOTING
The rise in support for minor parties in Australia has been reflected by survey

data showing weakening identification with the major parties. According to McAllister
and Muller, around 80% of voters identified with a major party in the 1960s. In the early
2010s, that figure declined to 70%, and in 2016 only 63% identified with a major party. 2

Ian McAllister and Damon Muller, “Electing the Australian Senate: Evaluating the 2016
Reforms,” Australian Journal of Political Science 70, no. 2 (2018): 155.
2
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Further, lifetime voting for the same party had declined from 72% in 1967 to 40% in
2016.3
In common with similar countries with single-member electoral systems,
elections in Australia have been dominated by large parties. The concept of
“Duverger’s law” proposes that voters in such systems are unlikely to waste their votes
on minor party candidates due to the improbability of them winning. As Denemark and
Bowler observe, “due to the low likelihood of electoral success for minor party
candidates, voters tend not to cast minor party votes unless they are dissatisfied with
both major party alternatives.”4 This principle is complicated in Australia by preferential
voting and proportional representation in the Senate, which ensure minor party votes
are not wasted. Nonetheless, politics in Australia continues to be seen by voters and
the media largely as a contest of two parties.
Conversely, Australia’s system of compulsory voting may present opportunities
for minor parties. Ordinarily, voters who feel dissatisfied with the state of politics
abstain from voting altogether. However, voters who are compelled to turn out may
instead express their dissatisfaction by lodging blank or invalid votes or voting for a
minor party.5 In arguing for the abolition of compulsory voting, former Liberal Senator
Nick Minchin claimed it was undemocratic and fostered the growth of minor parties.6
As cited by Bennett, Minchin said in a 2001 press conference (at a time when One
Nation was seen to be impacting Coalition votes) that compulsory voting was “aiding
and abetting One Nation-style destructive politics.”7
Historically, successful minor parties in Australia were typically assumed
centrist parties. These parties were able to gain support from “protest” voters
disaffected from the major parties.8 Van der Brug and Fennema defined protest voting
McAllister and Muller, “Electing the Australian Senate,” 152.
David Denemark and Shaun Bowler, “Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New
Zealand: Locating Populist Politics,” Electoral Studies 21 (2002): 48.
5
Marc Hooghe and Ruth Dassonneville, “A Spiral of Distrust: A Panel Study on the Relation
between Political Distrust and Protest Voting in Belgium,” Government and Opposition 53,
no. 1 (2016): 104 and 113.
6 Scott Bennett, “Compulsory Voting in Australian National Elections,” Parliament of
Australia, 2005, accessed 10 July 2021,
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2
Fprspub%2F06SH6%22;src1=sm1.
7 Bennett, 21.
8 Denemark and Bowler, “Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New Zealand.”
48-9.
3
4
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as “a vote primarily cast to scare the elite that is not policy-driven.”9 However,
successful minor parties have emerged in recent decades at both ends of the
ideological spectrum, namely the Greens on the left and One Nation on the right.10
Jiang and Ma argue that declining trust in government can encourage protest
voting for anti-establishment, unorthodox or ideologically extreme parties, particularly
on the right.11 Their study of the 2016 federal election found that this distrust was partly
related to a view that the economy had deteriorated over the previous two decades
and a lack of confidence in either major party to address the situation. 12 This was
consistent with the earlier findings of Denemark and Bowler that support for One
Nation was linked to economic evaluations, consistent with the reward-punishment
model of economic voting.13
The connection between economic factors and populist voting in Australia has
been complicated by the strength of the economy. A report from the University of
Canberra and the Museum of Australian Democracy noted the relatively mild effects
of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 in Australia and found the rise in
dissatisfaction with democracy had come at a time of economic growth or prosperity.14
However, the picture of economic good health in Australia has been complicated by
regional weaknesses that are potentially associated with electoral support for Pauline
Hanson in regional Queensland, Nick Xenophon in South Australia and Jacqui Lambie
in Tasmania. The third chapter of this thesis will further examine economic
regionalism, such as the impact of a downturn in the mining industry in areas where
One Nation has achieved strong support.

Wouter Van Der Brug and Meindert Fennema, “Protest or Mainstream? How the European
Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999,” European Journal of
Political Research 42, no. 1 (2003): 58.
10
Denemark and Bowler, “Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New Zealand,”
49.
11 Liang Jiang and Xiangjun Ma, “Political Distrust and Right-Wing Populist Party Voting in
Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science 55, no. 4 (2020), 367-368.
12 Jiang and Ma, 373.
13 Denemark and Bowler, “Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New Zealand,”
61.
14 Mark Evans, Max Halupka, and Gerry Stoker, “How Australians Imagine Their
Democracy: The Power of Us,” Museum of Australian Democracy, accessed 3 March 2021,
https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-07/apo-nid193921.pdf : 10
9
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2.3

MISTRUST IN DEMOCRACY
Declining trust in the political system in Australia and other liberal democracies

has been associated with the phenomenon of populism, which Ernesto Laclau
identifies with a perceived division between “the people” and a dominant elite.15 This
has been reflected in Australia in poor assessment of political parties and growing
dissatisfaction with political leadership. These issues have contributed to reduced
party identification and greater electoral volatility.16
There is evidence that lack of trust in democracy has become more pronounced
in Australia over the past decade. Survey data from 2016 showed the percentage of
respondents who were satisfied with democracy in Australia was at just 42%,
compared with 71% three years earlier.17 This reflects research across western
democracies showing a perception that major parties collectively represent an elite
out of touch with common concerns. Weakening trust in democracy has seen support
increase not only for populist causes but even for authoritarian, military and
“strongman” type leaders.
Populist ideologies typically follow the notion that the common people are
virtuous in their wisdom and that simple solutions solve complex problems.18 Rodney
Tiffen notes that populist parties identify a common enemy against the “ordinary
people” and are typically centred around a strong leader whose ideas shape the
platform of the party.
In Australia, research shows political cynicism to be a common theme among
disaffected voters. A survey by the Grattan Institute found many respondents thought
governments only looked after themselves or a few elite interests, and that politicians
did not empathise with ordinary voters or understand what they thought. Judith Brett
observed that 13.5% of federal parliamentarians in 1901 had been tradesmen, which
fell to 1.2% by 1996. According to research from Fairfax in 2017, nearly 50 per cent of
15

Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), 6.
Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, “Trust, Parties and Leaders: Findings from the 1987–
2016 Australian Election Study,” Parliament of Australia, accessed 3 March 2021,
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/pops/Pape
rs_on_Parliament_68/Trust_Parties_and_Leaders_Findings_from_the_1987_2016_Australia
n_Election_Study.
17
Mark Evans, Max Halupka, and Gerry Stoker, How Australians Imagine Their Democracy:
The Power of Us.
18 Rodney Tiffen, “We, the Populists (Ways of Seeing),” Griffith Review 2011, accessed 10
March 2021, https://www.griffithreview.com/articles/we-the-populists/.
16
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Liberal parliamentarians were either former political staffers, party officials or
government advisors.19 For Labor, 55% of its caucus had worked as political staffers,
while 40% had worked within the union movement.20 By contrast, many voters found
Pauline Hanson appealing because she was a small business owner and single
mother.
Decline in trust in democracy in Australia has been further encouraged by the
political circumstances prior to 2016, such as frequent changes in political leadership.
Over that time, changes of prime ministership have occurred with the replacement of
Kevin Rudd by Julia Gillard in 2010; the return of Kevin Rudd in 2013; the Coalition’s
election victory under Tony Abbott in 2013; the replacement of Abbott by Malcolm
Turnbull in 2015; and again with the replacement of Turnbull by Scott Morrison in
2018.21 Cameron and McAllister argue that the frequency of leadership changes has
been reflected in a decline in trust in politicians recorded by the Australian Election
Study series between 2010 and 2016.22 A 2021 study by McAllister and Dassoneville
showed that leadership trust declined as leadership changed. Previously, leadership
trust was cyclical. New leaders often inspired hope and optimism; however, this has
declined since 2013.23
Another factor that may have contributed to the appeal of minor parties is that
both major parties have regularly broken promises while in government. While this has
a long history in Australia, there were significant examples that immediately preceded
the survey period. Before the 2010 election, Prime Minister Julia Gillard ruled out
introducing a carbon tax in 2010 but went on to do so after forming a minority
government with the support of the Greens.24 Subsequently, then Opposition Leader
Tony Abbott stood in front of a billboard before the 2013 election stating there would
be “no cuts to education, health, pensions, changes to the GST, no cuts to ABC and

Tom McIlroy, “Australia's Career Political Class: Rising Number of Australian MPs Are
Former Staffers and Ministerial Advisers,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2017.
20 McIlroy.
21 Tiffen, Disposable Leaders, 1-3.
22 Cameron and McAllister, “Trust, Parties and Leaders.”
23 Dassonneville, Ruth, and Ian McAllister, “Explaining the Decline of Political Trust in
Australia.” Australian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (2021), 281.
24 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Carbon Tax: A Timeline of Its Tortuous History in
Australia,” accessed 15 November 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-10/carbontax-timeline/5569118.
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SBS” under a Coalition government. These promises were not kept, exacerbating low
opinions which the public held about governments and oppositions.25
A survey conducted in 2016 and 2017 by the University of Canberra and the
Australian Museum of Democracy recorded a widespread concern that politicians
were not held accountable for broken promises, and a belief that the major parties
were too similar. Protest and minor parties benefit in such circumstances, as voters
who are dissatisfied with the system are more likely to express their discontent by
turning away from the main parties, rather than switching support from one to the
other.26

2.4

CULTURAL ANXIETY AND IDEOLOGY
According to the Grattan Institute, a further influence for minor populist party

voting is “cultural anxiety”, which encompasses concerns about immigration, a
perceived loss of traditional cultural identity in western countries, and a sense among
workers of declining economic and social status. Such anxieties create perceptions
that the common voter has been left behind, particularly if they perceive their own
group to have once had more power.27
Much of the cultural anxiety associated with populist politics has been explained
in terms of hostility towards pro-immigration policies favoured by established
candidates and parties. A poll from Essential Research in 2016 showed that 52%
supported the idea that Australia should be more like it was in the past.28 A study by
the Grattan Institute found those who voted for right-wing minor parties, such as One
Nation and Australian Conservatives, were more likely to experience cultural anxiety
and have more negative views about the future of Australia. These voters usually

Mark Kenny, “Tony Abbott Pays Price for Broken Promises,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19
May 2014, accessed 11 June 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/tony-abbottpays-price-for-broken-promises-20140518-38hzw.html.
26 Marc Hooghe and Ruth Dassonneville, “A Spiral of Distrust: A Panel Study on the
Relation between Political Distrust and Protest Voting in Belgium,” Government and
Opposition 53, no. 1 (2016).
27 Grattan Institute, “A Crisis of Trust,” accessed 15 November 2019,
https://grattan.edu.au/report/a-crisis-of-trust.
28 Essential Research, “Statements About Australia,” accessed 15 November 2019,
https://essentialvision.com.au/statements-about-australia; Hooghe and Dassonneville, “A
Spiral of Distrust.”
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placed greater emphasis on the “Australian way of life”. This notion was more likely to
resonate with voters from regional parts of Australia.29
In the Australian context, David McKnight argues that the common thread
among populist parties is a view that both Liberal and Labor have done little to offer a
coherent alternative to neoliberal policies. A study by Mols and Jetten has shown that
populist parties of the right can thrive both in times of economic decline and prosperity.
During periods of economic decline, populists tend to use immigration as a scapegoat
because new migrants can be perceived as competitors in a weak labour market.30
This contributed to the success of One Nation at the 1998 election when they secured
8.4% of the national vote.

2.5

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP
Charismatic personalities, particularly those who present themselves as

outsiders against the supposed political elite, have been central to the rise of populist
politics. Kathryn Crosby notes that populist parties in Australia have built their support
directly around the appeal of their leading personalities, including Clive Palmer of the
Palmer United Party and United Australia Party, Bob Katter of Katter’s Australian Party
and Jacqui Lambie of the Jacqui Lambie Network, in addition to Pauline Hanson of
One Nation.31
This has not been limited to populist parties of the right. Nick Xenophon has
achieved electoral success in South Australia with his party, the Nick Xenophon Team
(subsequently named the Centre Alliance), which won three Senate seats at the 2016
election.32 Another party built around a popular public figure to achieve parliamentary
representation has been Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party. Hinch won a Senate seat in
Victoria at the 2016 election, and the party won a further three seats in the Victorian
Legislative Council in 2018.
Grattan Institute, “A Crisis of Trust”.
Frank Mols and Jolanda Jetten, “One Nation’s Support: Why ‘Income’ Is a Poor
Predictor,” Australasian Parliamentary Review 32, no. 1 (2017): 99.
31 Kathryn Crosby, “Populist, Populism or Personality?: What Is Actually Gaining in Support
and How to Test It.” Paper presented at the Australian Political Studies Association
conference, Melbourne, Australia, 25-27 September 2017,
https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/118337/1/Populism%20populist%20personality_
%20Crosby.pdf: 23-24.
32 Kathryn Crosby, Populist, Populism or Personality?: What Is Actually Gaining in Support
and How to Test It, 18.
29
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Pauline Hanson’s appeal has been built on her image as an unpolished political
“outsider” who has challenged the interests of the ruling elite.33 Clive Palmer, who won
a seat in the House of Representatives in 2013 while three of his party’s candidates
were elected to the Senate, had a celebrity approach to campaigning, presenting
himself as a regular Australian despite his status as a wealthy businessman.34

2.6

CONCLUSION
This chapter identifies many reasons why voters might be turning towards

minor parties generally, and populist parties. Successful minor parties in Australia
traditionally formed by breaking away from one of the major parties and drew much of
their support from voters making a short-term protest their usual party of identification.
While voters sometimes supported these parties due to their attraction to a charismatic
leader, they may equally have done so on protest grounds or for ideological reasons.
However, the recent rise in minor party voting has been driven by parties that
have been distinctively of the left or right, many of which have been built around a
popular leader after whom the party is named, such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation.
This has been a distinct new development related to declining identification with the
major political parties and growing mistrust in political leaders and democracy in
general. These trends have been encouraged by frequent leadership changes in the
major parties, broken election promises and a perception that leaders only look after
themselves or a select few.
Other explanations for declining trust and rising minor party support have
included a lack of confidence in both parties to address economic concerns, due to
their shared responsibility for neoliberal economic policies. Those who are more
inclined to support a minor party based on ideological reasons, particularly a populist
party of the right, may express views that are based around cultural anxiety and
aggressive nationalism. These factors arise where there is fear based around
perceived outsiders, be they cultural elites or immigrants, contributing to an “us and
them” attitude.

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, “About/Background – Pauline Hanson One Nation,”
accessed 10 November 2019, https://www.onenation.org.au/about.
34 Kathryn Crosby, “Populist, Populism or Personality?,” 24.
33
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The next chapter maps the rise, fall and second rise of One Nation, and
considers how the party fits into the explanations for minor party voting that have been
considered in this chapter.
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Chapter Two: The Emergence of One Nation
3.0

INTRODUCTION
One Nation is the most successful minor party of the right to have emerged in

Australia’s recent history. The party was founded after Pauline Hanson's election to
the House of Representatives seat of Oxley in 1996 and reached its electoral peak
when it won 11 seats in the Queensland parliament in 1998.
In this first phase of success, One Nation hoped to establish a lasting challenge
to the major parties in the lower houses of federal and state parliaments. Minor parties
in Australia had traditionally been restricted to the federal and state upper houses,
which are mostly elected by proportional representation, and excluded by the
majoritarian electoral systems of the lower houses. This reality was acknowledged by
Don Chipp, founder of the Australian Democrats party, when he said the party’s
objective was to use its position in the Senate to “keep the bastards honest”. One
Nation had a more ambitious strategy, with Hanson saying she was “not there to keep
the bastards honest”, but to “get rid of the bastards”.1
However, the early successes were followed by a long period of electoral failure
and disarray that lasted until the double dissolution election of 2016, when Hanson
and three other One Nation candidates were elected to the Senate. The party has
since re-established itself as a conventional upper house minor party, without
repeating the feat of its 1998 result in Queensland. As of the start of 2021, the party
has two Senators in the Commonwealth parliament and representatives in the
Queensland lower house and the upper houses of Western Australia and New South
Wales.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the first emergence of One Nation,
with a focus on why people voted for them. This chapter is predominantly focused on
the earlier period of One Nation success, which was the subject of a large body of
research. The thesis will then build upon this by examining the pattern of the party’s
support at the 2016 election in chapter five. This chapter will focus on the party’s

Grahan Young, “Anger and Discord Threaten Prosperity,” Australian Financial Review, 20
February 2001, accessed 27 July 2020, https://www.afr.com/politics/anger-and-discordthreaten-prosperity-20010220-k0vg7.
1

performance in its strongest state, Queensland, with some comparisons to New South
Wales and Western Australia, where One Nation has also won seats in both federal
and state parliaments.

3.1

THE RISE OF PAULINE HANSON AND THE FORMATION OF ONE
NATION: 1996-1997
Pauline Hanson is a former proprietor of a fish and chip shop who was elected

to federal parliament in 1996 in the seat of Oxley in outer Brisbane, a once safe Labor
seat where she had initially been endorsed as the Liberal candidate. Hanson came to
national attention during the election campaign after criticising the government for
providing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders with financial privileges which were
unavailable to white Australians.2 This led to her being disendorsed by the Liberal
Party, although she remained identified as the Liberal candidate on the ballot paper.
Hanson went on to win the seat with 48.6% of the vote, defeating Labor member Les
Scott with a 19.3% swing.3
Amid national media attention following her campaign and shock election win,
Hanson established her own political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, together
with David Oldfield and David Ettridge. Hanson’s “anti-politician” persona and political
views resonated with many voters who felt negatively impacted by the evolving socioeconomic situation in Australia. Some supporters who said they did not necessarily
agree with all her views said they admired her determination. Hanson was seen as a
champion of traditional values and cultural nostalgia. 4 She was nonetheless tolerant
towards “homosexuality and abortion”, although these views appeared to be at odds
with those of many of her supporters.5

Iva Ellen Deutchman and Anne Ellison, “A Star Is Born: The Roller Coaster Ride of
Pauline Hanson in the News,” Media, Culture & Society 21, no. 1 (1999): 38-39.
3 Deutchman and Ellison, 33-34.
4 Robert Mason, “‘Pitbulls’ and Populist Politicians: Sarah Palin, Pauline Hanson and the Use
of Gendered Nostalgia in Electoral Campaigns,” Comparative American Studies 8, no. 3
(2010), 186-7.
5 Kay Saunders, “Taking the International Spotlight: Pauline Hanson and Pauline Hanson's
One Nation Party,” Queensland Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 75.
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However, most of the media attention Hanson attracted related to race and
immigration.6 In her 1996 maiden speech, Hanson said: “I and most Australians want
our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I
believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians.”7 She continued to criticise
government programs that assisted Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, saying
existing policies were “encouraging separatism in Australia by providing opportunities,
land, moneys and facilities available only to Aboriginals.”8
Opinion polls showed Hanson’s new party was eroding the Coalition’s support
base.9 Despite Hanson’s inflammatory comments, the Liberal Prime Minister, John
Howard, appeared reluctant to address her views publicly. It was not until May 1997
that Howard said Hanson was “wrong by saying Australia is at risk of being swamped
by Asians, she is wrong to seek scapegoats for society’s problems.” Former diplomat
Phillip Flood said this was “an excellent statement but seven months too late.”10

3.2

ONE NATION’S FIRST PERIOD OF ELECTORAL SUCCESS: 19982001
The formation of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation was followed by a three-year

period in which the party won seats at two federal elections and state elections in
Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales. The most remarkable success
for the party was when it won 11 seats at the Queensland state election in June 1998.
Then as now, there was argument as to whether the party’s support was purely
cultural, and a reaction against multiculturalism, or whether it reflected economic
phenomena such as the decline of manufacturing.

Simon Jackman, “Pauline Hanson, the Mainstream and Political Elites: The Place of Race
in Australian Political Ideology,” Australian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 2 (1998):
167.
7 Pauline Hanson, “Pauline Hanson’s 1996 Maiden Speech to Parliament: Full transcript,”
last modified 15 September 16, accessed 24 July 2021,
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/pauline-hansons-1996-maiden-speech-toparliament-full-transcript-20160915-grgjv3.html.
8 Hanson.
9
Ian Ward, “Political Chronicle: July–December 1996,” Australian Journal of Politics and
History 43, no. 2 (1997): 221.
10 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Howard Years (2008). Video, 22:26,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nivMh3T7p-Y.
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3.2.1 Queensland 1998 State Election
One Nation recorded 22.68% of the vote in Queensland at the 1998 state
election despite not having fielded candidates in nine of the 89 seats, gaining six seats
from Labor and five from the Nationals. However, Labor largely compensated for these
losses by winning five seats from the Liberal Party, which lost almost a quarter of its
vote from 1995.11 Most of these gains were in Brisbane, reflecting relatively weak
support for One Nation in major cities. The party’s support was instead drawn from
areas with mostly white populations in the outer suburbs, regional towns and rural
areas.

Table 2: Top 20 seats for One Nation support (primary and two-party preferred) at Queensland state
election, June 1998

Electorate

Classification Primary

2PP

Second Party

Barambah*

Rural

43.5%

55.9%

Nationals

Maryborough*

Regional City

42.6%

58.3%

Labor

Tablelands*

Rural

42.0%

50.3%

Nationals

Ipswich

Outer Urban

39.5%

46.6%

Labor

Crows Nest

Rural

39.5%

49.1%

Nationals

Lockyer*

Rural

39.2%

53.7%

Nationals

Gympie

Regional City

39.2%

48.3%

Nationals

Ipswich West*

Outer Urban

38.6%

51.9%

Labor

Callide

Rural

37.7%

47.7%

Nationals

Burnett

Rural

36.4%

47.7%

Nationals

Thuringowa*

Regional City

34.9%

56.6%

Labor

Western Downs

Rural

34.5%

40.6%

Nationals

Bundamba*

Outer Urban

34.3%

43.8%

Labor

Hervey Bay*

Regional City

33.8%

55.3%

Labor

Burdekin*

Rural

33.1%

59.4%

Nationals

Cunningham

Rural

32.4%

41.1%

Nationals

Mulgrave*

Regional City

31.0%

54.1%

Labor

Paul Reynolds, “One Nation’s Electoral Support in Queensland: The 1998 State and
Federal Elections Compared,” in The Rise and Fall of One Nation, ed. Michael Leach,
Geoffrey Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 153-169.
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Whitsunday*

Rural

30.7%

51.7%

Nationals

Warwick

Rural

30.3%

38.1%

Nationals

Caboolture*

Outer Urban

29.9%

52.7%

Labor

* Seat won by One Nation. Source: Electoral Commission of Queensland

Table 2 illustrates where One Nation enjoyed its strongest support by listing the
20 electorates in which its primary vote was highest. This includes the 11 seats won
by the party, in some cases (such as Caboolture and Whitsunday) because they
received enough preferences to win despite recording lower primary vote shares than
in other seats where they were unsuccessful (notably Ipswich, Crows Nest and
Gympie). The table shows both the primary and two-party preferred vote for One
Nation, with a result of over 50% in the latter indicating that they won the seat.
The table shows that One Nation was successful in obtaining votes from the
Nationals’ heartland, where it gained the seats of Tablelands, Lockyer and Burdekin.
The question of country voters having a distinctive voice in Australian politics has a
long history, dating as far back as the formation of the Country Party in 1920. Many
country voters have felt forgotten by the major parties, contributing to the increasing
prevalence of distrust towards politicians.12 According to a study by Jennifer Curtin for
the Australian Parliamentary Library, people from rural areas were twice as likely as
others to vote for One Nation. Furthermore, they were more likely to express
dissatisfaction with the state of democracy.13
However, One Nation also won seats in outer metropolitan and regional areas,
reflecting their appeal to white working-class voters in areas that had traditionally been
strong for Labor. Two of the seats won by One Nation in the 1998 Queensland
Election, Caboolture and Ipswich West, were traditionally Labor-held seats located in
outer Brisbane. According to the 2001 census, 80.1% of residents of the Caboolture
local government area were born in Australia, while only 72.6% of people across the
nation were born in Australia. Caboolture also had more people employed in bluecollar jobs than the Australian average, with 7.4% of residents employed as
tradespeople compared with 6.9% nationally. Further, 6.1% were employed as
Jennifer Curtin, “The Voice and the Vote of the Bush: The Representation of Rural and
Regional Australia in the Federal Parliament,” Parliament of Australia, accessed 10 March
2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/monographs/curtin/curtinmonograph.pdf.
13 Curtin, 18.
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labourers compared to 4.8% across Australia as a whole. The Ipswich West electorate
had similar characteristics to Caboolture: 84.5% were born in Australia, and there were
higher rates of employment in blue-collar occupations than the Australian average. In
Ipswich West, 9.5% of people were employed as tradespeople and 7.0% were
labourers.

3.2.2 1998 Federal Election
The 1998 federal election was held on October 3, a few months after the
Queensland state election in June. One Nation ran candidates in most House of
Representatives electorates and for every state and territory in the Senate. In 1997,
an electoral redistribution in Queensland resulted in much of Hanson’s seat of Oxley
being transferred to the new seat of Blair. Hanson ran in Blair, which covered the
western part of her former electorate.14 In doing so she spurned the safer option of the
Senate, where proportional presentation increases the likelihood of a minor party or
independent winning a seat.15 However, One Nation’s success at the state election
was not repeated at the federal election, which was largely caused by preference
recommendations on the major parties’ how-to-vote cards.
The Queensland election promoted concern within the Howard government
over the impact of One Nation and debate over how it should respond. The former
Queensland state Nationals leader, Rob Borbidge, believed Hanson’s party would
hold the balance of power and effectively annihilate the Nationals at a federal level.
Media commentary at the time suggested One Nation could win as many as 15 seats
in the House of Representatives as well as seats in the Senate.16
The focus of the debate was where to place One Nation on Liberal and National
Party how-to-vote cards. As reflected in The Howard Years documentary, the topic of
preferences was sensitive for the Liberal Party. John Howard was unwilling to
condemn Hanson, believing she and her party would disappear if he ignored her.
However, other Liberal MPs such as Peter Costello, Alexander Downer and

Ian Ward, “Political Chronicle: July to December 1997,” Australian Journal of Politics and
History 44, no. 2 (1998): 242.
15
Scott Bennett and Rob Lundle, “Australian Electoral Systems,” Parliament of Australia,
accessed 27 July 2020, https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2007-08/08rp05.pdf.
16 Rae Wear, “Political Chronicle: July to December 1998,” Australian Journal of Politics
and History 45, no. 2 (1999): 256.
14

38

Christopher Pyne were more critical, and advocated joining Labor in directing
preferences against the party.17
This view was opposed by conservative Liberal Party MPs including Tony
Abbott, who pointed to the advantages of a preference deal with One Nation, arguing
their preferences had saved three Coalition seats from Labor at the state election.18
Two Nationals MPs from Queensland, Bob Katter and De-Anne Kelly, expressed
concerned about the safety of their seats. Both sided with One Nation on various policy
stances, such as being opposed to the privatisation of Telstra and the introduction of
a goods and services tax.19
In the event, the Liberals directed preferences against One Nation in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Nationals did so in all but six seats,
including four in Queensland and two in New South Wales. 20 Largely for this reason,
One Nation performed poorly at the election in terms of seats. The only seat won was
for the Senate in Queensland, and Hanson lost the newly created seat of Blair to the
Liberal candidate, Cameron Thompson.21 Nonetheless, the party recorded 8.4% of the
national vote in the House of Representatives and 9.0% in the Senate, the best result
by a minor party in terms of vote share since 1990.
The combination of cultural, economic and geographic factors observed by
Henry Reynolds at the Queensland state election was again evident in the federal
result.22 One Nation again attracted its strongest support in Queensland, particularly
in regional Queensland, and polled weakest in the inner areas of the major cities.
3.2.3 Sources of One Nation support
Prior to the 1998 federal election, Hanson focused her campaign on rural
workers, primary producers and small business owners, particularly those who had
been impacted by overseas competition. Gibson, McAllister and Swenson found that
One Nation supporters tended to be male and employed in blue-collar or working17

Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Howard Years. Video, 17:20.
Rae Wear “Political Chronicle: July to December 1998,” 254.
19 Wear, 255-257.
20 Wear, 356.
21 Michael Leach, Geoffrey Stokes, and Ian Ward, The Rise and Fall of One Nation (St
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000): 69.
22 Paul L. Reynolds, “Hanson and Queensland’s Political Culture,” in Two Nations: The
Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia, ed. Robert Manne
(Melbourne: Bookman, 1998): 147.
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class occupations. One Nation also had stronger appeal in regional and rural areas
compared to the cities.23 A subsequent study of voters in Queensland similarly found
that supporters of new conservative movements were predominantly male, older and
working class, while opponents had higher formal education.24
Evidently, some of the support for One Nation was cultural rather than
economic. Davis and Stimson also found that some cases were cultural, in that the
party was more likely to be popular in areas where there were less Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people and multicultural populations. 25 Many voters in
Queensland had concerns about native title, reflecting opposition to the Mabo and Wik
judgements among many voters in rural and regional communities.26 Ahluwalia and
McCarthy argued that resentment against a multicultural Australia had led to a cohort
of voters who had traditionally been supportive of Labor becoming disillusioned with
both major parties. Such voters reacted negatively to the previous Labor government’s
focus on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander issues and a foreign policy that
emphasised the Asian Pacific region.
The contention that One Nation supporters tended to be white, older, workingclass men was supported by Clive Bean’s research using survey data from the
Australian Election Study (AES) series.27 In the study, Hanson’s Heartland: Who’s for
One Nation and Why, Murray Goot identified the characteristics that typically defined
such voters: feelings of insecurity, inherent racism (a natural tendency towards a
cultural identity) or “the black hole where political leadership and vision should be”.28
While Goot found age was not a distinctive factor in identifying One Nation support, a
Rachel Gibson, Ian McAllister, and Tami Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration
in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 2
(2002): 826.
24 Winnifred R. Louis et al., “Speaking out on Immigration Policy in Australia: Identity
Threat and the Interplay of Own Opinion and Public Opinion: Speaking out on Immigration,”
Journal of Social Issues 66, no. 4 (2010): 664.
25
Robert Stimson and Rex Davis, “Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe:
Explaining the Geography of the One Nation Party Vote at the Queensland Election,” People
and Place 6, no. 3 (1998): 74.
26 Reynolds, “One Nation’s Electoral Support in Queensland,” 147.
27 Clive Bean, “Nationwide Electoral Support for One Nation in the 1998 Election,” in The
Rise and Fall of One Nation, ed. Michael Leach, Geoffrey Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 2000): 137.
28 Murray Goot, “Hanson’s Heartland: Who’s for One Nation and Why?,” in Two Nations:
The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia, ed. Robert Manne
(Melbourne: Bookman, 1998), 52.
23

40

contributor to the book The Rise and Fall of One Nation sourced data from the 1998
AES that found those aged 45 to 64 years were most likely to support One Nation,
although support among voters 75 and older was not as strong.
A study by Marian Sawyer also found that Hanson appealed to white males
who felt victimised by the Family Court, child support laws and feminism. Hanson had
also said that Anglo-Saxon men were the most downtrodden people in Australia.29
Further, Hanson claimed that unemployed single women were having children to gain
financial support from the government.30 A Morgan Gallup poll conducted prior to the
Queensland State Election in June 1998 found 46% of respondents believed Hanson
was “better than other politicians and knows what ordinary Aussies want” while 17%
believed she would “protect jobs, limit foreign investment and oppose foreign aid”.31 A
study by Davis and Stimson to identify the sources of One Nation support following
the Queensland election found that One Nation tended to have higher support among
unskilled workers in blue- collar industries, which eroded votes from the Labor Party.32
The defection of working-class Labor voters could be a reaction against the
economic rationalism of the Hawke/Keating government. The Hawke/Keating
government had been determined to establish itself as economically responsible,
particularly after the Whitlam years, including through the privatisation of parts of the
Commonwealth Bank, Qantas and Telstra.33 Hanson concentrated her campaigning
efforts on socio-economic populism, which targeted rural workers, primary producers
and small business owners who were feeling impacted by cheaper overseas
competition.34
Alexander noted that the early successes of One Nation inspired a wave of both
aggregate-level and survey-based studies investigating the effects of various
demographic variables on the party’s support, including economic factors such as
income and unemployment. The aggregate-level studies consistently found that
electorates with low income and high unemployment had particularly strong support
Marian Sawer, “Emily's List and Angry White Men: Gender Wars in the Nineties,” Journal
of Australian Studies: Country and Calling 23, no. 62 (1999): 3.
30 Sawer, 3.
31 Stimson and Davis, “Disillusionment and Disenchament at the Fringe,” 72.
32 Stimson and Davis, 78.
33
Judith Brett, The Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to
John Howard (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 170.
34 Gibson, McAllister, and Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia,”
824.
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for One Nation.35 Alexander’s own detailed aggregate-level study found several
economic variables to be associated with support for One Nation, notably SEIFA
(Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas) values for advantage, economic resources and
education. These measures were developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics to
rank geographic areas by subsets of census variables relevant to socio-economic
advantage or disadvantage.36
However, Alexander also noted distinctions between the two types of study,
with individual-level studies tending instead to emphasise the role of attitudinal rather
than economic factors. While a survey-based study by Bean also found an income
effect, survey-based studies by Goot and Gibson et al. failed to find similar effects for
unemployment.37 Nonetheless, the clear pattern of studies into One Nation support at
these elections was that support for the party was strongest in economically
challenged areas with low populations of non-English speaking migrants.
Aside from the fact of the party’s support being concentrated in Queensland,
these patterns were reflected in strong support in regional and rural areas as well as
the fringes of capital cities, which were characterised by relatively low incomes and
housing prices and large numbers of unskilled workers.38 However, Alexander noted
that support in rural and provincial areas was greater than economic factors alone
could explain.39 This pointed to a degree of disconnect among country voters,
particularly since decision making is often concentrated in the urban areas. The divide
between the regions and the city had also been observed by Jennifer Curtin in her
paper on The Voice and the Vote of the Bush, which will be further discussed in the
next chapter.

Stimson and Davis, “Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe”, 78; Paul
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Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 153-169.
36 Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas,” accessed 7 July
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and Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia,” 836-837.; Bean,
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Hanson promoted a vision that Australia needed to become more like it was in
the 1950s: self-sufficient, united and ethnically homogenous.40 These sentiments
reflected an anti-globalisation stance prompted by economic changes from the 1980s
that opened Australia up to greater competition from overseas.

3.2.4 Declining fortunes: 1999-2001
Following the relative disappointment of the 1998 federal election result, One
Nation again failed to repeat the high-water mark of its 1998 Queensland state
election. However, the party did manage to win upper house seats at the subsequent
state elections in New South Wales, Western Australia, and Queensland.
At the 1999 New South Wales election, One Nation won one seat in the
Legislative Council after recording 6.3% of the vote.41 This seat was won by the party
co-founder, David Oldfield. Compared to New South Wales, One Nation performed
better at the state election in Western Australia in February 2001. Like the Queensland
election, One Nation attracted strong support outside the metropolitan area, winning
seats in each of the three non-metropolitan multi-member Legislative Council regions:
Agricultural, Mining and Pastoral and South West. The party also contributed to the
defeat of Richard Court’s Coalition government through its policy of directing
preferences against sitting members.42
Between 1998 and 2001, all of One Nation’s 11 elected Members of Parliament
in Queensland quit the party, either becoming independents or defecting to the new
breakaway party, the City Country Alliance.43 At the Queensland election in February
2001, One Nation only secured three seats. This was reflected at the party’s
performance in the federal election the following November, when its national Senate
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vote fell from 8.99% to 5.54% and Hanson personally failed in her bid for a Senate
seat in Queensland.44

3.3

THE WILDERNESS YEARS: 2001-2016
After the 2001 federal election, the decline of One Nation became more evident.

This is illustrated in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3, summarising One Nation’s electoral
performance since 1998. This shows an evident collapse in the party’s fortunes
starting from 2001.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the decline occurred nationally, with support for One
Nation collapsing in each of the states where it won seats in either federal or state
parliament.
Figure 3 shows the performance of One Nation over 21 years at state elections
in Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia. For New South Wales and
Western Australia, the graph uses upper house results as the best basis for comparing
and analysing state-wide support, since One Nation has rarely contested all lower
house seats. The latter factor explains the minuscule results recorded for One Nation
in Queensland at the 2009 and 2012 state elections, at which it contested only a
handful of seats. However, One Nation has consistently run candidates in Queensland
state elections. Similarly, One Nation did not always run a candidate in every region
in the Legislative Council in Western Australia.

Table 3: Seats won by One Nation at federal and state elections, 1998-2001

State

State Election Years (Seats Won)

Queensland (Legislative Assembly)

1998 (11), 2001 (3), 2004 (1), 2006 (1),
2009 (0), 2012 (0), 2015 (0), 2017 (1)

New South Wales (Legislative Council)

1999 (1), 2003 (0), 2007 (0), 2011 (0),
2015 (0), 2019 (2)

44
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Western Australia (Legislative Council)

2001 (3), 2005 (0), 2008 (0), 2013 (N/A),
2017 (3)

Federal (Senate)

1998 (1), 2001 - 2013 (0), 2016 (4), 2019
(1)

Source: Electoral Commission of Queensland, New South Wales Electoral Commission, Western Australian Electoral
Commission, Australian Electoral Commission.

Table 3 shows that One Nation was able to retain some support in its strong
state (Queensland), particularly in regional areas. This helped One Nation retain the
seat of Tablelands from 2001 to 2009 in the Queensland parliament, giving the party
its last remaining parliamentary seat after it lost its Queensland Senate seat at the
2004 federal election.
Figure 2: Federal elections: One Nation primary Senate vote by state
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There were two main factors that led to the decline of One Nation in the early
2000s: the Howard government’s adoption of positions that appealed to Pauline
Hanson’s support base, and the party’s own internal problems. John Howard courted
One Nation voters during his early prime ministership by portraying them as Australian
battlers who were good upstanding people. The language used by Howard had
similarities to another Liberal Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, who said he stood for
the “forgotten people” of Australia. Overall, Howard claimed that his government

45

defended “middle Australia”.45 Regarding Indigenous issues, Howard refused to allow
Parliament to apologise to the Stolen Generation after the publication of the Bringing
Them Home report in 1997. This stance also contributed to his success.46

Figure 3: One Nation primary vote share at New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australian
state elections

Source: New South Wales Electoral Commission; Electoral Commission of Queensland; Western Australian Electoral
Commission. Figures shown are for the Queensland Legislative Assembly, New South Wales Legislative Council and Western
Australian Legislative Council.

However, the most significant event through this period was the Tampa crisis
in August 2001, in which the government turned away over 400 distressed refugees
who had been rescued as sea by a Norwegian container vessel. 47 Speaking at the
2001 federal Liberal party campaign launch, Howard said Australians were:
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… a generous open-hearted people taking more refugees on a per capita basis
than any nation except Canada. We have a proud record of welcoming people
from 140 different nations. But we will decide who comes to this country and
the circumstances in which they come.48

In an examination of the Howard prime ministership in The Monthly in 2006,
academic Robert Manne argued the Howard government had abandoned the
concepts of multiculturalism, integration with South-East Asia and reconciliation
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.49 In particular, the Tampa
episode had:
… brought to a definitive conclusion to the time in which the government –
under the shadow of the Hanson backlash against multiculturalism, Asian
immigration, Aboriginal land rights and globalisation – had first slowed and then
reversed the cultural trajectory of the Hawke and Keating Years.50

During this time, One Nation also experienced internal turmoil. According to
academic Jennifer Rutherford, who interviewed former One Nation members, there
was discontent over lack of democracy within the party and the controlling nature of
the organisation, which discouraged party members from talking to the media.51 Party
member Scott Balson claimed that party was “very autocratic, you would do as you
were told or get out”.52 The power of the party was concentrated in the hands of
Hanson, David Ettridge and David Oldfield, who appointed themselves as directors of
the party. Members also claimed that Ettridge used his power to expel members to
silence opposition and instil fear in others.53 The autocratic nature of the party was
Parliament of Australia. “[Campaign Launch Speeches]: Address at the Federal Liberal
Party Campaign Launch, Sydney,” accessed 13 June 2020,
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/partypol/1178395/upload_binary/11783
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confirmed by Heather Hill, who won the party’s Queensland Senate seat in 1998
before being disqualified for her dual British citizenship. Hill complained of a lack of
freedom of speech within the party, and that Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield held
“positions of absolute power”.54
The party’s internal crises were a factor behind the conviction of both Pauline
Hanson and David Ettridge on electoral fraud in August 2003, resulting in both being
sentenced to three years in prison. Hanson and Ettridge were found guilty of
fraudulently obtaining party registration under the Electoral Act 1992 (Queensland) by
supplying the names and addresses of 500 people who were party supporters rather
than members. Hanson and Ettridge were released after their convictions were
overturned the following November.55

3.4

THE ONE NATION COMEBACK: 2016-2019
Despite One Nation’s decline after 2001, the party held on to a single seat in

the Queensland Parliament through to 2009, and Pauline Hanson came close to
winning a seat on at least one occasion. However, the party would not return to
prominence until the 2016 double dissolution election.

3.4.1 The 2016 federal election and its aftermath
Prior to its success in winning four Senate seats at the 2016 federal election,
Pauline Hanson’s profile was boosted by her performance at the 2015 state election
in Queensland, when she ran in the seat of Lockyer. In that seat Hanson won 49.78%
of the two-party preferred vote, falling narrowly short of defeating the Liberal National
Party candidate with 50.22%. After preferences there were barely more than 100 votes
between the two candidates.
The party’s breakthrough came after the then Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull,
called a double dissolution election for July 2016. Since all 12 Senate seats in each
state are vacated at a double dissolution, this resulted in a lower quota for election
and improved opportunities for strongly performing minor parties. One Nation duly
succeeded in winning two Senate seats in Queensland, including by Hanson herself,
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together with further seats in New South Wales and Western Australia, despite
recording only 4.28% of the Senate vote nationally.56
The return of Hanson to the national spotlight was followed by further
successes in subsequent state elections. One Nation did particularly well in the seat
of Mirani at the 2017 Queensland state election, which was gained from Labor. In
Western Australia, One Nation won three seats in the Legislative Council at the 2017
state election. At the New South Wales 2019 state election, One Nation won two seats
in the Legislative Council, including one for former federal Labor leader Mark Latham.

3.5

CONCLUSION
As was the case when the party first emerged in 1998, One Nation’s resurgence

in 2016 has prompted debate as to whether it can best be understood in terms of
cultural factors or economic strains. The Grattan Institute’s report into the “rise of
protest politics in Australia” argues cultural issues have been paramount, with those
voting for One Nation and other right-wing minor parties emphasising the importance
of on the “Australian way” of life. This perspective has been further encouraged by the
fact that the global financial crisis, which was seen to have stimulated right-wing
politics internationally, was less severe in Australia than most comparable
democracies.
However, the pattern of support for One Nation has been reflected by economic
challenges faced by regional areas, particularly those dependent on the mining
industry. It has been in these areas that One Nation has achieved localised support at
both federal and state elections in recent years. As well as the party’s success in the
Senate in Queensland in 2016, this has contributed to the party’s return to the
Queensland and Western Australian state parliaments in 2017, in the first case by
winning a seat in the state’s north and in the second by winning three seats in the
Legislative Council, with the highest levels of support coming from the state’s regional
and mining areas.

Clare Blumer, “Election Results: Here's How the 2016 Figures Stack up Historically,”
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, accessed 1 December 2017,
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-03/election-results-historical-comparison/7560888.
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Chapter Three: Economic Voting
4.0

INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the economy and voter behaviour has been long

established in political science. However, since the focus of research has been the
conditions in which changes in government occur, studies have tended to assume
two-party competition and neglect minor parties. The objective of this chapter is to
evaluate the different models of economic voting as a basis for minor party voting.
While imperfect as predictors of election outcomes, these models provide valuable
insights into the motivations of voters. This chapter refers to parties that are populist,
defined by the Oxford Handbook of Populism as “the idea that ‘the people’ can
authoritatively recover power from the government to reconstitute institutions, or
wrestle power from corrupt or self-serving elites”.1 It is proposed that a failure of the
political establishment to address economic concerns has resulted in voters turning to
populist options such as One Nation, rather than continuing to alternate between the
existing major parties.

4.1

ECONOMIC VOTING THEORIES
Economic voting refers to the theory that voters are inclined to vote for or

against the incumbent based on economic performance. Voters evaluate their wellbeing and receive information regarding the state or nation’s economic climate and
form their judgement accordingly. International research shows the economy is of key
importance in determining election outcomes.2
In Australia, research shows voters value strong economic management, and
often view both the microeconomic and macroeconomic situation as important for
determining vote choice.3 An opinion poll from Roy Morgan in mid-2017 indicated that
38% of Australians regarded the economy or an economic issue as the most important

1

The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, et al., Oxford
Handbooks Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 3.
2
Suzanna Linn and Jonathan Nagler, “Economic Voting and Economic Inequality: U.S.
Presidential Elections 1952–2012,” American Politics Research 45, no. 4 (2017): 594.
3 Andrew Gunn and Michael Mintrom, “Political Leadership and Public Policy Debate in the
2016 Australian Federal Election,” Australasian Parliamentary Review 32, no. 1 (2017): 45.

problem concerning Australians.4 Similar patterns have emerged from the Australian
Election Study survey series, in which management of the economy was ranked the
most or second most (after health) important out of 10 election issues in 2010, 2013
and 2016.5

4.1.1 Pocketbook and sociotropic voting
Research into economic voting, particularly in the United States, has
emphasised the distinction between pocketbook and sociotropic effects. Sociotropic
voting involves assessment of the condition of the national or regional economy in
choosing which party to vote for.6 Pocketbook voting involves choosing which party to
vote for based on an assessment of which will provide the most personal financial
benefit.7 Researchers of voter behaviour have been divided on the importance of these
two effects, but most found sociotropic assessments to be the most important.
Research in the United States has indicated that voters in presidential elections
tended to support the incumbent when the economy was performing well, even if they
were worse off financially.8 However, a study by Healy, Persson and Snowberg has
indicated that both factors are significant. This was because voters are “not myopic”
and use their own economic information to make inferences about the broader
economy, with the result that pocketbook and sociotropic considerations are both
important.9
Survey data from 2016 Australian Election Study found the Coalition
government had won the election despite voters considering their personal financial
Gary Morgan and Michele Levine, “Economic Issues ‘Unemployment’ and ‘the Economy’
Top the List of Concerns for Australians in Mid-2017,” Roy Morgan Research,
http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/7264-issues-facing-australia-economics-verbatims201707071732.
5 Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, “Trends in Australian Public Opinion: Results from the
Australian Election Study 1987-2016,” Australian National University, accessed 20
December 2020, https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/Trends-inAustralian-Political-Opinion-1987-2016.pdf, 32.
6 Andrew Healy, Mikael Persson, and Erik Snowberg, “Digging into the Pocketbook:
Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey,”
American Political Science Review 4, no. 111 (2017): 773-774.
7 Lee Sigelman, Carol K. Sigelman, and David Bullock, “Reconsidering Pocketbook Voting,”
Political Behavior 13, no. 2 (1991): 129
8 Michael S. Lewis and Mary Stegmaier, “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes,”
Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 192-194
9 Healy, Persson and Snowberg, “Digging into the Pocketbook,” 783.
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prospects to be better than those for the economy. In response to a survey question
relating to Australia’s financial situation, 47% said it had become worse with only 10%
reporting an improvement. However, respondents were less negative about their
personal situation, with 35% reporting they were worse off compared with a year ago
and 48% saying their situation was about the same. Overall, the study showed voters
were less likely to expect the economy to improve nationally, with most expecting the
economy would either remain the same or get worse.10
These results showed that voters were engaged with a perceived negative
economic situation, which according to the sociotropic model should have prompted
them to vote against the incumbent. The outcome of the election raises the possibility
that negative sociotropic evaluations that might have led voters to favour the major
party in opposition were instead responsible for the unprecedented levels of support
recorded by minor parties, and by One Nation.

4.1.2 Reward-punishment model
The reward-punishment model of voting behaviour suggests voters reward
governments for good economic management by re-electing them and punish poor
performance by voting for the opposition.11 The idea that incumbents suffer defeat due
to economic mismanagement has strong support. As Gabor Simonovits notes,
“hundreds of academic articles” argue that incumbents suffer when economic
conditions worsen.12
While the reward-punishment model is theoretically applicable to any
democracy, researchers of Australian voter behaviour have been sceptical of its value
in explaining electoral outcomes. According to Hellwig and McAllister, “the research
on electoral behavior in Australia suggests that economic voting is, at best, weak”.13
McAllister argued that this weakness could be explained by short three-year (federal)
election cycles and strong economic performance over a long period.

Cameron and McAllister, “Trends in Australian Public Opinion,” 44.
Geoffrey Evans, “Social Class and Voting” in The Sage Handbook of Electoral Behaviour,
ed. Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans, and Michael Lewis-Beck (London: SAGE Reference,
2017): 177-198.
12
Gabor Simonovits, “An Experimental Approach to Economic Voting,” Political Behaviour
37, no. 4 (2015): 977.
13 Timothy Hellwig and Ian McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter? Economic Perceptions
and the Vote in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2016): 236.
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Furthermore, research from 2008 showed over half of Australian voters felt the
“world economy” was mostly responsible for economic conditions in Australia,
compared with less than 30% for government policymakers.14
However, the notion of weak economic voting effects in Australia has been
challenged by Leigh and Wolfers, based on econometric models for forecasting
elections. The study of such models in relation to the 2004 election concluded that
these models “merited greater prominence in the media and in public discourse”.15
They also noted the 2004 election results suggested such models were becoming
“increasingly important” despite evidence for economic voting in Australia having been
“historically weak”.16

4.2

OTHER RELEVANT MODELS
Much of the Australian literature on voting behaviour has emphasised

sociological factors such as class and migrant background rather than economic
evaluations. While such considerations remain important, growing electoral volatility
suggests an increased potential for voters to switch between parties based on a
reward-punishment response. This has been reflected in landslide election results in
New South Wales in 2011, Queensland in 2012 and Western Australia in 2017 and
2021, which are consistent with a greater role for short-term evaluations, including
those based on the economy.

4.2.1 Party identification
The party identification theory relates to hereditary voting where voters form
lasting attachments to parties through parental socialisation in childhood. Hellwig and
McAllister note that hereditary voting has only modestly declined in Australia
compared to other countries, which they attribute to institutional factors, strength of
party identification and how Australian voters attribute responsibility for policy
outcomes.17

Hellwig and McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter?,” 238.
Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, “Competing Approaches to Forecasting Elections:
Economic Models, Opinion Polling and Prediction Markets,” The Economic Record 82, no.
258 (2006): 336.
16 Leigh and Wolfers, 325.
17 Hellwig and McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter?”, 237-239.
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While McAllister’s research found strong party identification to be related to a
relative weakness of economic voting in Australia, subsequent trends have called the
strength of party identification into doubt. Research from Australian National
University’s Trends in Australian Political Opinion (1987-2016) found the number of
respondents who said they always voted for the same party fell from 72% in 1967 to
40% in 2016.18 The changes were particularly steep over elections between 2013 and
2019, as minor party voting in the Senate increased markedly. The share of
respondents citing no party identification went from 14% in 2010 to 17% in 2013 and
19% in 2016, while the number identifying as lifetime party supporters went from 31%
to 21% for Liberal and National Party voters and 24% to 16% for Labor voters.19
The decline in identification with the major parties has not been matched by a
rise in identification with minor parties. While there was a rising trend for the Greens
from 1996, only 9% identified with the party in 2016. Instead, there was a faster rate
of increase in those recording no party identification, from 14% in 2010 to 17% in 2013
and 19% in 2016.
Arguably, change in the political environment had recurred throughout
Australian electoral history, and the party identification model had never provided a
reliable guide to voter behaviour. Murray Goot has criticised the primacy of the party
identification model in research derived from the Australian Election Study, arguing
the concept fails to account for instability in the party system over time, and particularly
for “new parties that attract substantial electoral support”.20

4.2.2 Class voting
Class voting refers to voters’ tendency to vote according to the social class with
which they identify21, which has been a cornerstone of party competition in Australia.
Labor has historically drawn support from the working-class, while the Liberal Party
and its predecessors have sought support outside of the non-manual sector to achieve
electoral majorities.22
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However, the strength of class voting in Australia has lately come into question.
This trend has been reflected in a confusion of class identity in Australian politics.
Accounts of the electoral success of John Howard argue that he related to voters who
perceived themselves as “battlers”, in contrast to Paul Keating, the Labor leader he
defeated in 1996. Howard seized the opportunity to connect with blue-collar voters,
while Keating focused on non-economic issues.23 This suggested an ongoing
weakening of the association between Labor and the working class, which had long
been the foundation of party identification in Australia.24
Class voting can be re-examined through two different perspectives. It can refer
to economic assets (whether in savings or investment) and/or social and cultural
capital. A person may be less inclined to prioritise their employment prestige, opting
to focus on appreciating the arts and the quality of their social networks.25 Based on
polling from the Australian National University, a study found that there are five
observable classes in Australia. These include: established affluent, emergent
affluent, mobile middle, established middle and established working class. 26 Given the
findings from Biddle and Sheppard, there is evidence of social mobility among the
working and middle classes. For those who are more affluent, their position tends to
reflect their parents’ economic and social standing.
A study by McAllister and Makkai found that voters with higher amounts of
economic assets were more like to vote Liberal-National, whereas Labor and Greens
tended to lose support from these voters. In terms of cultural factors, the study also
found that musical activities predispose a voter to support centre-left parties, whereas
family-based activities tend to predispose people to the centre-right.27 McAllister and
Murray Goot and Ian Watson, “Explaining Howard's Success: Social Structure, Issue
Agendas and Party Support, 1993-2004,” Australian Journal of Political Science 42, no. 2
(2007): 254.
24 Goot and Watson, 269-271.
25 Savage, Mike, Fiona Devine, Niall Cunningham, Mark Taylor, Yaojun Li, Johs
Hjellbrekke, Brigitte Le Roux, Sam Friedman, and Andrew Miles, “A New Model of Social
Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey Experiment.” Sociology
(Oxford) 47, no. 2 (2013): 219–50.
26 Nicholas Biddle and Jill Sheppard, “How many classes does it take to describe
Australians? The answer may surprise you,” Australian National University, 25 October
2015, https://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/how-many-classes-does-it-take-to-describeaustralians-the-answer-may-surprise-you.
27 McAllister, Ian, and Toni Makkai, “The Decline and Rise of Class Voting?: From
Occupation to Culture in Australia.” Journal of Sociology (Melbourne, Vic.) 55, no. 3 (2019),
438-440.
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Makkai noted in their literature review that some studies have found class voting has
evolved in the post-industrial area.

4.2.3 Materialism and post-materialism
Materialism and post-materialism are both terms used widely in Australian
research, particularly in explaining minor parties such as the Australian Democrats
and the Greens. A post-materialist voter is more likely to consider “quality of life” issues
when voting, whereas the materialist voter is more concerned with physical security
and economic well-being.28 Post-materialist issues include the environment, women’s
issues and human rights. Generally, people who grew up in situations of financial
security are more likely to have post-materialist values than those who grow up with
financial hardship.29 The post-war era provided a rapid economic and social change
that the pre-war generation did not experience, reflected in a greater focus on
materialist values among the older generation. Post-materialism is identified with the
political left, and its ideals are associated in current Australian politics with the Greens,
whose supporters tend to be tertiary-educated and reside in inner city areas.30
In examining non-economic factors, it appears that post-materialism and
cultural interests can also have an influence on voting behaviour. Both support for
post-materialism values (i.e. support for environmental care) and cultural activity
engagement tend to predispose a person to support left-wing parties.

4.3

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND VOTING PATTERNS

4.3.1 Unemployment and underemployment
Unemployment is a common concern among voters, particularly young and
middle-aged workers. According to Helgason and Mérola, higher rates of occupational
unemployment often led to negative evaluations of the economy.31 The unemployment

28

Ronald Inglehart, Modernisation and Post-Modernisation: Cultural, Economic and
Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): 33-36.
29 Mark Western and Bruce Tranter, “Postmaterialist and Economic Voting in Australia,
1990-98,” Australian Journal of Political Science 36, no. 3 (2001): 440.
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(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016): 75-77.
31 Agnar Freyr Helgason and Vittorio Mérola, “Employment Insecurity, Incumbent
Partisanship, and Voting Behavior in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Political
Studies 50, no. 11 (2017): 1493-1494.
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rate in Australia has fluctuated somewhat, increasing because of the global financial
crisis and the end of a mining and resources boom. At the time of the 2016 election,
the unemployment rate was 5.7% compared with 4.1% in April 2008, shortly before
the onset of the crisis.32
While the number of workers working less than one hour a week remains
modest, this obscures a rising problem of underemployment. The Australian Bureau
of Statistics has a broad definition of unemployment that considers a person employed
if they work for one hour or more a week.33 Underemployment refers to workers that
have part-time employment but are unable to find full-time work despite the desire to
work more hours.34 The underemployment issue relates to many challenges
experienced by Australians on low to middle incomes that may be reflected in feelings
of hostility towards the major parties, and a desire to collectively “punish” them on
economic grounds.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics released a spotlight study on
underemployment that showed young people (aged 15 to 24) and low-skilled workers
were most heavily affected. Until February 2003, the unemployment rate was lower
than the underemployment rate. However, over the last 15 years, underemployment
has continuously surpassed the unemployment rate at around 8.7%, with the
unemployment rate hovering between 5% and 6%.35
Issues of underemployment have been given further impetus by the rise of the
“gig economy”. While underemployed workers may use gig work such as Uber driving
to supplement their income, other issues arise from this type of work. A prominent
example is the lack of superannuation, which will impact a young worker’s future as
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they reach retirement age.36 Further, due to the nature of “gig” employment,
companies can bypass standard labour laws, which include the minimum wage.37
Unlike a regular job where the employee has equipment and material supplied to
complete tasks, gig employees have to supply their own.38
Underemployment and gig economy employment are important economic
issues, particularly for young voters. A study conducted in 2013 found approximately
one in five young people had voted for minor parties.39 Most of this support has been
for the Greens, particularly in inner-city areas. However, the federal electorate of
Herbert, based around Townsville in north Queensland, is an example of a regional
electorate with many young voters (according to the 2016 census, the average age in
the electorate is 33, compared with 38 nationally) where the growth of the minor party
vote has gone to populist parties, including One Nation.

4.3.2 Income and economic Inequality
Income inequality has been a prominent point of discussion in political science
in explaining the rise of populist politics. However, the extent of income inequality as
an issue in Australia is disputed. A study by Alan Fenna and Alan Tapper found the
growth in inequality had only been modest.40 This contrasts with the view of John
Quiggin, who says that income inequality has grown substantially since the 1980s,
“both because of short term variability has increased and because lifetime income has
become riskier.”41
The discussion around income inequality in Australia has been centred on the
growing gap between the rich and poor as the economy has moved towards market
liberalisation. Income inequality has been encouraged by the de-unionisation of the
Dale Boccabella and Sarah Kaine, “How Gig Economy Workers Will Be Left Short of
Super,” accessed 17 November 2019, https://theconversation.com/how-gig-economyworkers-will-be-left-short-of-super-85814.
37
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workplace, which has tended to weaken wage growth as workers have lost bargaining
power, while also reducing the traditional union base of the Australian Labor Party.
This is a potential economic explanation for One Nation support, much of which comes
from working-class voters who formerly supported Labor.42

4.3.3 Inflation
Inflation has not been a significant issue in Australian elections in recent times,
as the rate has been relatively low since the early 2000s. According to the Reserve
Bank of Australia, inflation as of May 2018 sat at 1.9% and has hovered between 1%
and 2% since 2015.43 This contrasts with the 1970s when inflation played a major role
in the difficulties of the Whitlam government.44 After the 1980s, inflation levels
remained relatively stable, with fewer extreme fluctuations.45
Survey research suggests voters tend to hold right-wing governments to a
higher standard on inflation, whereas for left-wing governments the emphasis is more
on unemployment.46 Palmer and Whitten have theorised that voters are most
concerned when increases in consumer prices are unexpected. Generally, voters
would not punish the incumbent if increases were foreseen or accounted for in future
economic planning. The study contrasted the re-election of the Labour government in
New Zealand in 1987, when the country was experiencing negative economic growth
and high inflation, with a decline in electoral support for the governing party in Canada
in 1988, where inflation was modest. The difference between the two elections was
that economic conditions were worse than expected by Canadian voters.47
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While these results do not correlate with the reward-punishment model,
concern about inflation may still have an important effect on elections and public
policy. A study from Tim Vlandas has shown the significance the elderly vote has in
motivating governments to combat inflation. Generally, older voters are more likely to
be inflation averse. In countries that have a large ageing demographic, the elderly
voter becomes more powerful, which results in governments pursuing lower inflation.48
While this study focused solely on one voting demographic, it outlined the connection
between the elderly, inflation-averse behaviour and support for conservative parties.

4.3.4 Housing affordability
Another problem associated with income inequality is housing affordability.
Housing stress has been an issue for many Australians, with home ownership falling
for Australians under 65.49 From 2001 to 2011, the median house price escalated from
$167,000 to $417,000 while post-tax wage growth increased only from $36,000 to
$57,000. Further, housing affordability moved from three times the average annual
wage to nine times.50
Pauline Hanson sought to tie the housing affordability issue to immigration, by
blaming it for increasing housing prices.51 Overall, housing affordability has been a
crucial voter issue. A survey in 2017 found that approximately 35% of respondents
acknowledged the issue as important, jumping from around 22% in 2014. The only
political issue ranked higher than housing affordability in 2017 was health care.52
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4.4

MICROECONOMIC FACTORS
Microeconomic factors refer to localised or industry-specific factors. These

factors are of significance to this thesis, as their effects tend to be concentrated in
electorates that have suffered from the decline of manufacturing or short-term
downturns in industries such as mining. Such changes may have led to disaffection
with mainstream political parties and made alternatives more appealing.
Localised workforce changes in the mining and resources industry have
created problems for Labor, which has had to reconcile the interests of its blue-collar
base with concerns for climate change and the environment. An example at federal
level is the electorate of Hunter in New South Wales, held as of 2021 by Joel
Fitzgibbon of the Labor party’s Right faction. This area is known for coal mining, with
9% of its workforce employed by the coal mining sector according to the 2016 census,
compared with 0.6% for New South Wales as a whole. At the 2019 election, Labor’s
primary vote decreased from 51.6% to 37.6%, in large part due to the success of One
Nation in polling 21.6%. Fitzgibbon resigned from the Labor front bench in 2020
because he believed Labor was alienating its blue-collar support base through its
pursuit of carbon emission targets.53
Another notable area where issues relating to the mining industry have
influenced voter behaviour is in regional Queensland, particularly around Townsville,
which has likewise experienced growth in support for One Nation and other small
parties at several federal and state elections. Townsville was noted as a prosperous
economy with a fly-in-fly-out economy at the peak of the economic boom before 2008,
but experienced double-digit unemployment as commodity prices fell. Townsville was
particularly struck by the liquidation of a nickel refinery owned by Clive Palmer, who
had held the Queensland seat of Fairfax in the House of Representatives with his
Palmer United Party from 2013 to 2016.54 The company collapsed in 2015 with the
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loss of 800 jobs.55 Many struggled to find work, while others who found work were
earning less money compared to their refinery job.56 Minor party candidates, notably
those of One Nation and Katter’s Australian Party, won around a third of the vote
between them in the Townsville seats of Thuringowa and Mundingburra at the 2017
Queensland state election.
Industry transition has also been a crucial part of economic change in Australia.
Car manufacturing was for many years a strong industry, especially in the years after
World War II. However, the industry has undergone long-term decline, particularly over
the past two decades, reflecting broader trends in manufacturing.57 The change began
in the 1970s and 1980s when Australian governments began shifting towards market
liberalisation. The Hawke-Keating Labor government policies pursued anti-inflation
measures, tariff reduction and deregulation, which reflected the policy trends under
Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom.
This coincided with the privatisation of entities such as Qantas and Commonwealth
Bank. Privatisation had been controversial, particularly among the traditional workingclass support base of the Labor Party. According to John Quiggin, the move towards
market liberalisation has resulted in increased inequality.58
Economic change in Australia is demonstrated clearly in the manufacturing
sector. Twenty-five per cent of men were employed in manufacturing in 1978, but by
1997 the rate was below 18%.59 Figures from 2017 show that manufacturing now
makes up less than 8% of the Australian workforce.60 The decline of manufacturing
over recent decades has been particularly significant for the economy of South
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59 Ian McAllister and Clive Bean, “The Electoral Politics of Economic Reform in Australia:
The 1998 Election,” Australian Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (2000): 385.
60 Penny Vandenbroek, “Snapshot of Employment by Industry, 2017,” accessed 2 July 2017,
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/FlagPost/2017/April/Stats-Employment-Industry.
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Australia. The scaling down and closure of Holden car manufacturing at Elizabeth in
northern Adelaide from 2013 cost 950 jobs, which was followed by an increase in the
state’s unemployment rate from 5.8% to 6.1%. 61 A study found there would be 1,600
job losses from 2013 to 2017 as a direct result of the Holden car manufacturing plant
closure. It was estimated that the flow-on effects could increase South Australia’s
unemployment figure by 13,000.62
This may have contributed to the dissatisfaction with the major parties in South
Australia, which was evident when the Nick Xenophon Team recorded 24.9% of the
Senate vote in 2013 and 21.8% in 2016, and the related SA-Best party polled 14.2%
of the vote at the state election in 2018.63 Xenophon campaigned on local issues in
South Australia, particularly the closure of car manufacturing plants. However,
compared with One Nation, support for Xenophon’s parties was evenly distributed
across the state. An analysis by Catherine Hanrahan for the ABC found no correlation
between income and support for Xenophon, nor were there any correlations between
current or former manufacturing workers and support for Xenophon.64

4.5

CONCLUSION
In summary, the political science literature provides substantial evidence for

economic effects on voting behaviour. The US literature finds clearer evidence of
sociotropic than pocketbook effects, while providing evidence that both play a role.

David Washington, “SA’s Post-Holden Unemployment Rate Increases,” accessed 30 April
2018, https://indaily.com.au/news/2017/12/14/sas-post-holden-unemployment-rateincreases/.
62 Mark Dean, “Parliament in the Periphery: Sixteen Years of Labor Government in South
Australia, 2002-2018,” Australasian Parliamentary Review 33, no. 2 (2018): 29-30.
63 University of Western Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Senate election in South
Australia: Election of 7 September 2013, accessed 7 September 2021,
https://elections.uwa.edu.au/elecdetail.lasso?keyvalue=1877; University of Western
Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Senate election in South Australia: Election of 2 July
2016, accessed 7 September 2021,
https://elections.uwa.edu.au/elecdetail.lasso?keyvalue=1918; University of Western
Australia, Parliament of South Australia, House of Assembly election: Election of 17 March
2018, accessed 7 September 2021,
https://elections.uwa.edu.au/elecdetail.lasso?keyvalue=1931&summary=false.
61

Catherine Hanrahan, “Who Elected the One Nation, Xenophon and Lambie Senators?,”
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 13 February 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/201610-28/who-elected-one-nation-xenophon-lambie/7825106?pfmredir=sm.
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The evidence in Australia has been weaker, but the main alternative explanation,
strength of party identification, has been brought into question by the increases in
minor party voting. This has occurred at a time when parts of Australia have
experienced an economic downturn, reflected in high rates of underemployment as
well as unemployment. Local examples of economic change which can impact political
outcomes include the downturn in the mining industry affecting areas including
regional Queensland and the closure of car manufacturing in South Australia. Equally
significantly, these areas have experienced a significant increase in minor party
support, specifically for One Nation in Queensland and Nick Xenophon’s party in South
Australia.
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Chapter Four: One Nation Case Study
5.0

INTRODUCTION
The first chapter explored issues that may explain minor party voting and found

that economically motivated protest voting to be a significant factor, particularly in
relation to the surge in minor party support over the past decade. Chapter two focused
on the initial emergence of One Nation with a focus on the factors underpinning their
support, which included economic vulnerability in regional areas and among white
blue-collar workers. The third chapter reviewed existing political science research into
economic voting in Australia and noted that recent work on election forecasting found
economic indicators had some value in predicting election outcomes, despite the
tendency of academic literature to downplay the role of economic voting in Australia.
This chapter considers whether the 2016-2017 surge in minor party voting
represented an emergence of economic voting in Australia, using One Nation’s
performance at the 2016 federal and 2017 Queensland state elections as case
studies. Linear regression analysis is used to establish the statistical relationship
between key economic indicators and the vote for One Nation across different polling
booths. The economic factors that are examined are unemployment and income, both
in absolute terms and with respect to change between the 2011 and 2016 censuses,
with the latter serving to measure the impact of industry decline in certain parts of the
country. The data collected for this study was extracted from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Electoral Commission of
Queensland.1

5.1

2016 FEDERAL ELECTION (SENATE)
Before proceeding with the linear regression analysis, this section details the

economic circumstances prevailing in regional Queensland at the time of the 2016
federal elections and their potential electoral consequences through a review of the
relevant census and election results data.

1

I am grateful for the assistance of election analyst, William Bowe, who assisted me in
extracting and interpreting the data.

Table 4: Top ten booths for One Nation, primary vote - Senate election 2016

Booth

Division

State

ON Senate Vote

Flagstone Creek

Wright

QLD

37.55%

Kentville

Wright

QLD

37.52%

Glenore Grove

Wright

QLD

34.79%

Helidon

Wright

QLD

34.71%

Blenheim

Wright

QLD

34.61%

Forest Hill

Wright

QLD

34.07%

Ma Ma Creek

Wright

QLD

32.88%

Laidley

Wright

QLD

31.81%

Lake Clarendon

Wright

QLD

31.73%

Curra

Wide Bay

QLD

31.66%

When polling booths with fewer than 200 formal votes are excluded (as they
will be through the remainder of this discussion), the 52 strongest booths for One
Nation out of a total of 6347 were all in Queensland. This is illustrated in Table 4, which
shows the ten booths with the highest One Nation vote share. One Nation support was
particularly strong in the electorate of Wright, a largely rural electorate in the state’s
south-east. Outside of Queensland, One Nation’s strongest booth was the Cobar PrePoll Voting Centre in the electorate of Parkes (22.91%), in the interior of New South
Wales. In Western Australia, the One Nation vote was likewise highest in country
(Durack and O’Connor) and semi-rural (Canning) seats.
Conversely, the 18 booths where One Nation recorded zero votes typified
where their support was particularly weak. These are listed in Table 5, in descending
order of formal votes cast. Most are in inner urban electorates in Sydney, Melbourne
and Hobart, but they also include three strongly Indigenous booths in the seat of
Leichhardt in northern Queensland, and booths with high migrant populations in the
Melbourne seats of Menzies, Hotham and Bruce.
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Table 5: Booths with zero primary votes for One Nation, primary vote- Senate election 2016

Booth

Division

State

Formal Votes

Fitzroy

Melbourne

VIC

1803

Hawthorn PPVC

Higgins

VIC

1437

Newmarket

Melbourne

VIC

1335

North Melbourne

Melbourne

VIC

1317

Box Hill PPVC

Menzies

VIC

1302

Murrumbeema South

Hotham

VIC

1260

Richmond West

Melbourne

VIC

1177

Middle Park

Melbourne Ports

VIC

1158

Waimea Heights

Denison

TAS

828

Kowanyama

Leichhardt

QLD

445

Oakleigh

Hotham

VIC

421

Napranum

Leichhardt

QLD

358

Syndal South

Bruce

VIC

302

Shoreham

Flinders

VIC

272

Noble Park

Bruce

VIC

256

Tamwoy

Leichhardt

QLD

232

Merricks North

Flinders

VIC

224

Annandale

Sydney

NSW

221

5.1.1 Unemployment and the 2016 election
The analysis below details support for One Nation at polling booth level at the
2016 Senate election, matched to the unemployment rate at the corresponding SA1
(Statistical Area Level 1) as recorded at the censuses of 2011 and 2016. Table 6
displays the top 15 booths in the country by unemployment rate, again restricted to
booths with 200 or more formal votes. The range in support for One Nation in these
booths’ points to differences between low-income urban and regional areas,
particularly urban areas with high populations of non-English speakers as compared
with regional areas with higher populations of English-only speakers.
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Table 6: One Nation vote and SA1 unemployment rate by polling booth, primary vote- Senate election
2016

Booth

Division

State

Unemployment ON Vote

Cherbourg

Wide Bay

QLD

50.00%

1.15%

Yarrabah

Kennedy

QLD

46.31%

0.28%

Hope Valley

Leichhardt

QLD

42.13%

1.57%

Warrawong

Cunningham

NSW

40.00%

3.10%

Aurukun

Leichhardt

QLD

37.92%

0.70%

Kowanyama

Leichhardt

QLD

36.64%

0.00%

Moree East

Parkes

NSW

36.29%

9.42%

Hawksburn Central

Higgins

VIC

36.19%

0.67%

Acacia Ridge South

Moreton

QLD

34.38%

9.34%

Collingwood

Melbourne

VIC

34.32%

0.25%

Kirwan South

Herbert

QLD

33.33%

13.15%

Coledale Community

New England

NSW

32.97%

4.88%

Napranum

Leichhardt

QLD

32.86%

0.00%

Tweed Mills

Calare

NSW

32.56%

12.12%

Moe

McMillan

VIC

30.53%

5.23%

Owing to the clear split between metropolitan and country areas, there is no
obvious relationship between unemployment and support for One Nation at a national
or state level. Urban booths with high or increasing unemployment nonetheless
recorded relatively low support for One Nation. For example, the highest
unemployment rate for a Queensland metropolitan booth was at Acacia Ridge South,
in the Brisbane seat of Moreton (as displayed in table 6). This booth recorded an
increase in unemployment from 16.40% in 2011 to 34.38% in 2016. However, 9.34%
of the formal votes went to One Nation, which is well below many other areas in
regional Queensland where One Nation’s percentage share was in the double digits.
Significantly, this is a multicultural area where nearly half the population (48%) speaks
a language other than English at home.
In Warrawong Central, One Nation received only 31 of the 1033 total formal
votes (3.1%). Like Acacia Ridge South, the Warrawong Central area is linguistically
diverse, with only 44.59% of the population speaking only English at home. Such
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results are consistent with the low level of support for One Nation among voters from
ethnically diverse backgrounds. This reflects Pauline Hanson’s views on immigration
and multiculturalism, which have been covered in the earlier chapters.
In regional areas, however, there were notable examples of strong One Nation
support in pockets of rising unemployment. The Kirwan South booth in the Townsville
seat of Herbert, where unemployment increased from 13.80% to 33.33% between
2011 and 2016, had 264 out of 2008 formal votes go to One Nation. However, a
significant variation in this pattern was regional areas with high Indigenous
populations, which had high and rising unemployment but low One Nation support. Of
the high unemployment booths listed in Table 6, three of the top six were Hope Vale,
Aurukun and Kowanyama in the north Queensland electorate of Leichhardt, where the
Indigenous populations were respectively 92.95%, 90.84% and 90.68% of the total.
Overall, an examination of the unemployment data shows it is difficult to make
assumptions about an area without understanding the demographics of the region,
specifically in relation to the size of its non-English speaking population and the
number of Indigenous people. These factors will be considered in the statistical
analysis.

5.1.2 Regression and unemployment/unemployment growth
The following section features a linear regression analysis of the relationship
between the dependent variable of One Nation Senate vote by polling booth at the
2016 federal election, and the key independent variables of unemployment and
unemployment growth.
Tables 7 and Table 8 show the results of modelling identifying the relationship
between unemployment in 2016 and the One Nation vote, using the rate of
unemployment rate in the former case (the “rate” model) and the change in the
unemployment rate between the 2011 and 2016 censuses in the latter (the “growth”
model). As will be the case throughout this chapter, the models include control
variables to account for differences between the states and the metropolitan/regional
divide. They account for the fact that One Nation performs strongly in Queensland
compared to other states, where the rise in minor party support was instead reflected
in the success of parties including the Nick Xenophon Team in South Australia and
the Jacqui Lambie Network in Tasmania.
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The state-level effects are accounted for with dummy variables for each of the
six states other than New South Wales. New South Wales is intentionally excluded as
a “reference” group, so that estimates of the One Nation vote in this state can be
achieved by setting the other state dummy variables at zero. These serve as control
variables so that the economic variables produce results independent of these effects.
Similarly, “Regional” is a dummy variable set at 1 for booths located outside the
metropolitan areas, and 0 for those within them.
Reflecting the patterns noted in the previous section, the models also include
variables for the percentage of the population that speaks only English at home, and
for the Indigenous population. This recognises the fact that unemployment figures
alone, or even economic factors alone, do not explain the variation in One Nation
support across the country. Clearly support for populist parties must be understood
partly in terms of cultural factors, as represented here through the language and
Indigenous variables.

Table 7: Regression results for One Nation Senate (primary) vote by polling booth at 2016 federal
election (2016 unemployment rate model)

Unstandardised B

Std. error

Sig.
p value

(constant)

-.011

.002

.000

Unemployment Rate

.138

.011

.000

English Spoken Only

.047

.003

.000

Indigenous

.-002

.008

.756

Regional (dummy)

.028

.001

.000

VIC dummy

-.021

.001

.000

QLD dummy

.051

.001

.000

WA dummy

-.002

.002

.198

SA dummy

-.017

.002

.000

TAS dummy

-.029

.002

.000

R2 = 0.532

A brief overview of the terminology used in this thesis is as follows. The p-value
refers to the statistical significance of the relationship, with a relationship deemed
significant when the value is below 0.050, and highly significant when it is below 0.010.
Coefficients record the mathematical relationship between the dependent and the
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independent variables. When there is a positive coefficient, the mean value of the
dependent variable tends to increase as the value of the independent variable
increases. When there is a negative coefficient, the dependent variable tends to
decrease as the independent variable increases. The R2 value refers to the line of best
fit, which is between 0 and 100% (or 0 and 1), with 0% indicating no relationship and
100% a perfect relationship.2

Table 8: Regression results for One Nation (primary) Senate vote by polling booth at 2016 federal
election: growth in unemployment rate model (2011-2016)

Unstandardised B

Std. error

Sig.
p value

(constant)

.003

.002

.111

Unemployment

.080

.012

.000

English Spoken Only

.037

.003

.000

Indigenous

.030

.007

.000

Regional (dummy)

.020

.001

.000

VIC dummy

-.021

.001

.000

QLD dummy

.052

.001

.000

WA dummy

-.002

.002

.278

SA dummy

-.015

.002

.000

TAS dummy

-.027

.002

.000

Growth

R2 = 0.532

The results in Tables 7 and Table 8 show that unemployment had a statistically
significant positive relationship with the One Nation Senate vote in both the “rate”
model and the “growth” model. The coefficients for unemployment are 0.138 for the
former and 0.08 for the latter. This suggests that for every extra percentage point in
the unemployment rate, a booth would typically record an extra 0.138% in support for
One Nation. For unemployment growth, every percentage point of increase between
2011 and 2016 typically resulted in a 0.08% increase in the One Nation vote

Jim Frost, “How to Interpret P-Values and Coefficients in Regression Analysis,” accessed
23 August 2019, https://statisticsbyjim.com/regression/interpret-coefficients-p-valuesregression.
2
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Figure 4: Unemployment rate and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate election by
polling booth (Queensland)

R2=0.004

The results for the control variables confirm the points noted earlier: that One
Nation support is highest in English-speaking areas, regional areas and in Queensland
generally. The variables measuring these effects have statistically significant positive
coefficients. Conversely, relatively weak support for the party in Victoria and South
Australia is reflected in the negative coefficients for these variables. Since the state
dummy variables provide a comparison with the reference variable of New South
Wales, the lack of a significant result for Western Australia shows there was little
difference in One Nation support between these two states. The Indigenous variable
does not appear to help explain the pattern of One Nation support as the coefficient is
positive, contrary to expectations. As will be discussed in the next section, this variable
had the expected effect at the Queensland state election.
The relationships between One Nation support in Queensland and
unemployment and unemployment growth are illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5. It is
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necessary to focus on one state for this chart due to the importance of state-level
effects, as demonstrated by the dummy variables in Table 7 and Table 8.

Figure 5: Unemployment growth (between 2011 and 2016) and One Nation primary vote (percentage)
at 2016 Senate election by polling booth (Queensland)

R2=0.015

The R2 values for Figure 3 and Figure 4 are extremely low, indicating weak
relationships overall. However, the regression results show how important it is to
recognise that these graphs include data for the whole of Queensland. The state
contains wide variation in ethnic diversity, particularly between Brisbane and the rest
of the state. Further, both charts display many outliers in which there is high
unemployment (and unemployment growth) and weak support for One Nation. Such
results may reflect a high population of Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander people
and/or people from non-English speaking backgrounds. Figure 6 below illustrates the
relationship between areas that were not linguistically diverse and the One Nation
vote.
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Figure 6: English spoken only and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate election by
polling booth (Queensland)

R2=0.110

Notwithstanding the outliers, the chart records an overall positive relationship
between speaking English only and support for One Nation, consistent with the party’s
lack of support among non-English speakers. While each of these graphs indicate that
unemployment and language provide only partial explanations for patterns in One
Nation support, the effects they demonstrate are clearly statistically significant.

5.1.3

Indigenous voters and One Nation
In considering the effects of income and unemployment on the level of One

Nation support, it is important to account for the unusual behaviour of booths in remote
Indigenous communities. Many areas with high Indigenous populations also have low
incomes and high unemployment. If the relationship were straightforward, it would
follow that One Nation would enjoy strong support among Indigenous voters, when
clearly the opposite is true.
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Previous election results have indicated that few Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders vote for One Nation. In Pauline Hanson’s 1996 maiden speech, she not only
she targeted immigrants from Asian countries, but was also critical of Australia’s first
peoples. When speaking about Indigenous people, Hanson said that “present
governments are encouraging separating in Australia by providing opportunities, land,
moneys and facilities available only to Aboriginals”.3 Further, One Nation voters tend
to have a harsher attitude towards immigrants and Indigenous Australians compared
to Liberal and Labor voters.4 As the pattern of voting in remote communities
demonstrates, Hanson’s views are evidently not popular with Indigenous Australians.

Tracey Bunda, “Indigenous Australians and the Legacy of European Conquest,”
in Indigenous Australians and the Law, 2nd ed., ed. Martin Hinton, Daryle Rigney, and Elliott
Johnston (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008): 4.
4 Rachel Gibson, Ian McAllister, and Tami Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration
in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 2
(2002): 827.
3
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Figure 7: Indigenous population and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate election by
polling booth (Queensland)

R2=7.159E-6

The plot above illustrates the relationship between the Indigenous population
and support for One Nation, using Queensland booths only for purposes of clarity.
Given Indigenous people only make up a small minority of the population (2.8%), the
plot shows that most parts of the country have a low population of Indigenous people,
with the distinct exception of Indigenous communities at the northern end of
Queensland. The booths from these communities form a cluster at the top left,
indicating negligible support for One Nation. To control for peculiarity of Indigenous
booths, the linear regression models include a variable recording the Indigenous share
of the population.
The distinctiveness of Indigenous voting can be further illustrated by examining
the booths with the highest Indigenous populations from the federal electorate of
Leichhardt, which covers the Cape York Peninsula in north Queensland. According to
the 2016 census, 4% of the Queensland population is either Aboriginal Australian or
Torres Strait Islander compared to 2.8% of the total Australian population. However,
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the Indigenous communities of north Queensland are a distinctive outlier in this
respect.

Table 9: Leichhardt booths and remote Indigenous communities

Booth

Indigenous

Median

Population

(weekly)

Income One Nation
Senate
Primary Vote

Aurukun

90.83%

$677

4 out of 572

Bloomfield

92.1%

$682

6 out 216

Kowanyama

90.67%

$841

0 out of 445

Lockhart River

89.64%

$810

2 out of 260

Napranum

95.57%

$770

0 out of 338

Pormpuraaw

88.36%

$733

4 out of 338

This point is demonstrated by Table 9, which records the six booths in
Leichhardt with the highest shares of Indigenous population. In every case, Indigenous
persons are the overwhelming majority among the local population. The second
notable feature of the results is the low levels of income. The median family incomes
are all less than $850 and in one case $677, which compares with $1661 in
Queensland as a whole.
The booths are equally exceptional for their lack of One Nation support. The six
between them recorded only 16 Senate votes for One Nation at the 2016 election out
of a combined total of 2189, for an overall share of 0.7%. While the regression model
has provided a useful overview of the relationship between income and One Nation, it
is clear the model is not useful as a guide to Indigenous voting behaviour.

5.1.4 Data analysis: income and the One Nation Senate vote
This section extends the analysis from the unemployment rate to income levels,
again considering both the results from the 2016 census and the change recorded
between the censuses of 2011 and 2016. As was established previously in the
discussion of “pocketbook” voting effects, income growth is fundamental to
consideration of economic voting.
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Table 10: Regression results for One Nation primary Senate vote by polling booth at 2016 federal
election: median weekly family income model

Unstandardised B

Std. error

Sig.
p value

(constant)

.033

.002

.000

Median Weekly Family

-.019

.001

.000

English Spoken Only

.050

.022

.000

Indigenous

.008

.025

.224

Regional (dummy)

.019

.007

.000

VIC dummy

-.023

.001

.000

QLD dummy

.051

.001

.000

WA dummy

-.000

.001

.876

SA dummy

-.021

.002

.000

TAS dummy

-.032

.002

.000

Income ($’000)

R2= 0.557

As with the earlier consideration of unemployment, Table 10 and Table 11 show
results for one model including median family income as a variable (the “rate” model),
and another including the change in income variable, measured in percentage terms
between the 2011 and 2016 censuses (the “growth” model).
Based on these results, the relationship between income and the One Nation
Senate vote, considered independently of the other variables, is negative and highly
significant both for rate model and the growth model. This indicates that higher rates
of income or income growth were reflected in lower rates of One Nation support. This
is as would be expected if voters were turning to One Nation due to a weak or
deteriorating personal financial situation. In this case, each additional $1000 in median
family income was associated with a 1.9% reduction in the One Nation vote, while
each percentage point of growth from 2011 to 2016 was associated with a 1.2%
reduction. This further supports the notion that economic factors played an important
role in determining the level of support for One Nation.
As was the case for the income models in Table 4 and Table 5, statistically
significant negative coefficients for Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania show that
One Nation performed worse in these states than in New South Wales, while their
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performance in Queensland was much stronger. Regarding South Australia and
Tasmania, the lower One Nation vote is likely caused by strong support for other local
minor parties, namely the Nick Xenophon Team in South Australia and the Jacqui
Lambie Network in Tasmania. However, the Victorian results appear to reflect a
general weakness in support for populism in that state.
The results for the language, regional and Indigenous variables were also
similar in the income and unemployment models. Regional areas were stronger for
One Nation regardless of both their income and unemployment levels, while the
opposite was true for areas with large non-English speaking populations. As was the
case for unemployment, there was no indication that the Indigenous population was
negatively correlated with support for One Nation at the federal election, in contrast to
the Queensland state election.
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Table 11: Regression results for One Nation primary Senate vote by polling booth at 2016 federal
election: median weekly family income growth model

Unstandardised Std. error

Sig.

B

p value

(constant)

.007

.002

.000

Median Weekly Family

-.012

.002

.000

English Spoken Only

.036

.00 3

.000

Indigenous

.032

.007

.000

Regional (dummy)

.030

.001

.000

VIC dummy

-.021

.001

.000

QLD dummy

.053

.001

.000

WA dummy

-.001

.002

.634

SA dummy

-.014

.002

.000

TAS dummy

-.027

.002

.000

Income growth

R2 = 0.522

The finding of a negative relationship between income and One Nation support
is consistent with an analysis from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation which
showed people from more educated backgrounds were less likely to vote for One
Nation, which was consistent across all states. 5 This finding is consistent with earlier
studies indicating that One Nation voters tended to come from blue-collar
backgrounds.6 Further, the ABC analysis confirmed One Nation were more likely to
attract votes in disadvantaged suburbs compared to wealthier areas.
Studies on the first emergence of One Nation in the late 1990s indicated that
voters were frustrated by both the Labor and Liberal Party’s failures to tackle issues
such as unemployment and future job opportunities.7 Voters were concerned about
the decline in protectionist policies as jobs were moved offshore to countries with
Catherine Hanrahan, “Who Elected the One Nation, Xenophon and Lambie Senators?,”
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 13 February 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/201610-28/who-elected-one-nation-xenophon-lambie/7825106?pfmredir=sm.
6
Murray Goot and Ian Watson, “One Nation's Electoral Support: Economic Insecurity
Versus Attitudes to Immigration,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 47, no. 4
(2001): 160-162.
7 Gibson, McAllister and Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia,” 826.
5
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cheaper labour. This resonated strongly with blue-collar workers and small business
owners.8 The data indicates that many areas with high populations of such voters have
experienced a decrease in their median earnings from 2011 to 2016. A vote for One
Nation is one way that some such voters may have expressed their discontent with
the current economic climate and the two major parties.

Figure 8: Median family weekly income and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate
election by polling booth (Queensland)

R2=0.144

5.1.5 Income plots: a comparison between Queensland, Western Australia and
Victoria
The plots below use three states in a comparative study to illustrate the
relationship between income and support for One Nation. These are Queensland, One
Nation’s strongest state; Western Australia, one of three states where a Senator was
elected in 2016; and the more progressive state of Victoria, where the party has never

8

Gibson, McAllister and Swenson, 826 – 830.
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won a seat. Taken together, these charts show clear relationships when the results
are viewed independently of state-level variation. While effects are evident for both
unemployment and income, the relationship is distinctly clearer in the case of income.
Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between median family income in
Queensland and the One Nation Senate vote in 2016. Figure 9 uses Western Australia
as a further example. While support for the party in Western Australia was lower
across the board than in Queensland, the general nature of the relationship was similar
in both states.

Figure 9: Median weekly family income and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate
election by polling booth (Western Australia)

R2=0.112

As noted previously, support for One Nation is considerably weaker in Victoria
compared with Queensland and Western Australia. As illustrated in Figure 10, there
were some exceptions where polling booths had a One Nation vote higher than 10%,
but the majority did not exceed 5%. The areas with the lowest One Nation vote in
Victoria were typically from the inner city of Melbourne and its wealthier “blue-ribbon”
areas. Between the three graphs, Victoria appears to have fewer outliers compared to
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Queensland and Western Australia. Nonetheless, the pattern is consistent in that each
state has a negative relationship between median income and support for One Nation.

Figure 10: Median weekly family income and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2016 Senate
election by polling booth (Victoria)

R2=0.177

5.2

QUEENSLAND 2017 STATE ELECTION
This section extends the analysis to the Queensland state election of December

2017. Queensland state elections are of interest because of the high level of volatility
over the past decade. This was best demonstrated by the rapid rise and fall of the
Liberal National Party government of Campbell Newman. This government was
elected with a massive majority in 2012, defeating the Labor government of Anna
Bligh. However, it was removed from office after a single term at the 2015 state
election. The scale of the swing at these elections is significant because it is consistent
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with a weakening of the strong party identification that Hellwig and McAllister
associated with weak economic voting effects in Australia.9
The 2017 Queensland state election was also notable for rising support for
minor parties, with the combined support for Labor and the LNP falling below 70%.
There was a particularly strong increase in minor party support in the northern and
western parts of the state. Most significantly, One Nation recorded an increase in
support even in comparison with their strong Senate results at the 2016 federal
election. One Nation won 13.73% of the vote in at the 2017 state election, despite not
running in 32 out of the 93 seats, compared with a Senate vote of 9.19%. This made
One Nation the third strongest party in the state, outpolling the Greens on 10.0% of
the first preference vote. While One Nation only won one seat, it is significant that that
seat was Mirani in central Queensland, where the controversy over the Adani coal
mine appeared to fuel support for the party among workers affected by the downturn
in the mining industry.
Polling data prior to the election indicated that voters were concerned about a
variety of issues, several of which were economic in nature. According to an opinion
poll on the most important out of eight campaign issues, the leading issue was jobs,
particularly outside south-east Queensland, where 29% rated it very important
compared with 40% elsewhere. North Queensland was an area of concern for the two
major political parties, with rising unemployment appearing to encourage support for
minor parties.10
This section of the chapter uses similar methods for the 2017 Queensland state
election results as were applied in the previous section to the 2016 Senate results. It
should be noted that the dataset for Queensland is technically incomplete, given that
One Nation did not have a candidate in every seat. Further, the seats where One
Nation had candidates tended to be in regional areas. Nonetheless, if the patterns at
the federal election in relation to income, language, and weakness in One Nation
support in Indigenous communities have wider significance, it can be expected that
they will have been replicated at the state election.

Timothy Hellwig and Ian McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter? Economic Perceptions
and the Vote in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2016): 238.
10 Trenton Akers, “On the Bus: Inside the 2017 Queensland Election,” Queensland Review
25, no. 1 (2018): 67.
9
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5.2.1 One Nation’s popularity and federal comparison
In most respects, the pattern at the 2017 state election was consistent with the
Senate result in 2016. The seat of Mirani, which One Nation won with 32.0% of the
primary vote, is covered by the federal electorates of Capricornia and Dawson, where
One Nation recorded their fifth (15.6%) and eighth (13.3%) highest levels of support
in the Senate. However, One Nation recorded a higher vote at the state election in
Lockyer (34.4%), despite not winning the seat. Lockyer shares many of the booths
situated within the federal electorate of Wright, where the Senate vote was 16.9%, the
third highest in the state. One Nation recorded its highest Senate vote in the seat of
Flynn (18.4%), which largely corresponds with the state seats of Burnett and Callide.
The seats also recorded among the highest votes for One Nation at the state election,
at 26.7% and 25.6% respectively.
Furthermore, in common with the Senate results, the weaker booth results for
One Nation were in urban areas, particularly the inner city, and areas with high
Indigenous populations. Two electorates that illustrate this are the federal seat of
Moreton and the state seat of Toohey, which cover the same area of southern
Brisbane. One Nation polled only 2.9% of the Senate vote in Moreton, their third
weakest result in the state after the inner-urban seats of Ryan and Griffith. At the state
election, One Nation had its third weakest result in Toohey.
Overall, these results are consistent with the urban-regional divide. While the
2016 census reveals that two-thirds of the Australian population live in capital cities,
more than half of Queensland resides outside the capital, leaving a large proportion of
people living outside the city compared to other states.11 The divide between urban
and regional Queensland is not only reflected in election results, but also in how
people perceive government policy.
Polling during the state election campaign identified a view that the state
government was spending more on the metropolitan and coastal electorates than the
bush, particularly when it came to infrastructure. The Labor government was perceived
to have spent more on the south-east by 70% of country respondents, compared with

Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Census Reveals Two Thirds of Our Population Live in
Australia’s Capital Cities,” accessed 17 October 2019,
https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/lookup/Media%20Release10.
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54% of Queenslanders as a whole.12 Despite these perceptions, a spending
breakdown per capita showed that there was an allocation of $3,150 for regional
infrastructure spending and only $1,709 in the south-east. The results also showed
that city voters were more optimistic about their future than those in regional areas,
particularly where One Nation performed strongly.

5.2.2 Income, unemployment and the 2017 state election
Based on the linear regression analysis of the 2016 Senate election, both
income and income growth were negatively correlated with support for One Nation.
This section considers whether these results remained consistent for the 2017 state
election.
The relationship between income and One Nation support in 2017 is illustrated
by Table 9 for median family income and Table 10 for the change in income between
2011 and 2016. This uses the same linear regression model for the state results as
for the federal election in the previous section, excluding the state dummy variables,
which are only relevant to a national election.

Table 12: Regression results for One Nation primary vote by polling booth at 2017 Queensland state
election: median weekly family income model

(constant)

Unstandardised Std. error

Sig.

B

p value

.114

.022

.001

Median Family Income ($’000) -.052

.006

.000

English Spoken Only

.215

.021

.000

Indigenous

-.132

.025

.000

Regional (dummy)

.008

.007

.238

R2 = 0.213.

As was the case for the Senate, the results show a significant negative
relationship between income and support for One Nation. However, the relationship is

Paul Williams, “One, Two or Many Queenslands? Disaggregating the Regional Vote at the
2017 Queensland State Election,” Australasian Parliamentary Review 33, no. 2 (2018): 68.
12
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less clear for the state election, which is illustrated by comparison of the plots for
Queensland at the federal election (Figure 8) and the state election (Figure 11). While
the coefficient was higher for the state election, the R 2 value was low, reflecting a
higher number of outliers and a lack of clarity in the relationship.

Figure 11: Median weekly family income and One Nation primary vote (percentage) at 2017
Queensland state election by polling booth

R2=0.043

For the non-economic variables, “English Spoken Only” and the “Regional”
dummy variable had highly significant positive relationships at both elections.
However, the coefficients for both, and especially for “English Spoken Only”, were
higher for the state election. This indicates that these factors did more to explain the
result at the state election. It should be noted again that One Nation did not contest
32 of the 93 seats and that the uncontested seats were disproportionately in
metropolitan areas. However, it should also be observed that the state election was a
stronger result overall for Labor, as the party won re-election with 35.4% of the primary
vote and 51.2% of two-party preferred. At the 2016 federal election, Labor only
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received 30.9% of the primary vote for the House of Representatives in Queensland
and 45.9% of two-party preferred. The distinction between the two results may be that
Labor performed better among low-income voters at the state election.

Table 13: Regression results for One Nation primary vote by polling booth at 2017 Queensland state
election: median family income growth model

Unstandardised Std. error

Sig.

B

p value

(constant)

.026

.025

.034

Median Family Income growth

-.028

.015

.060

English Spoken Only

.230

.022

.000

Indigenous

-.080

.025

.001

Regional (dummy)

.007

.007

.299

R2 = 0.152.

Table 13 shows the results for the model with change in income from 2011 to
2016, corresponding to the Senate results in Table 5. Here too, the evidence for an
effect is weaker in the case of the state election. While the coefficients were negative
in both cases, for the state election the result was not statistically significant. Again,
the coefficients for “English Spoken Only” and “Regional” were higher at the state
election.

Table 14: Regression results for One Nation primary vote by polling booth at 2017 Queensland state
election: unemployment model

Unstandardised

Std. error

B

Sig.
p value

(constant)

.003

.021

.887

Unemployment Rate

.204

.059

.001

English Spoken Only

.235

.022

.000

Indigenous

-.132

.029

.000

Regional (dummy)

.008

.007

.292

R2 = 0.161
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Table 13 and Table 14 show the results for the models that use unemployment
rather than income measures. As with the income models, the results are similar to
those from the federal election, although the significance levels are somewhat lower.
The coefficient for the unemployment rate suggests each percentage point was
associated with a 0.204% increase in the One Nation vote, independently of the other
variables. For unemployment growth, the effect was 0.126% for each percentage point
of increase in the unemployment rate.

Table 15: Regression results for One Nation primary vote by polling booth at 2017 Queensland state
election: unemployment growth model

Unstandardised B

Std. error

Sig.
p value

(constant)

.020

.020

.317

Unemployment

.126

.062

.040

English Spoken Only

.230

.022

.000

Indigenous

-.085

.025

.002

Regional (dummy)

.007

.007

.309

Growth

R2=0.153

5.2.3 Indigenous Voters and the 2017 State Election
The results from the Senate election indicated that support for One Nation was
particularly weak in Indigenous communities. As noted previously, this complicates
the relationship between income and support for the party. This section replicates the
study of Indigenous voting patterns from the Senate in the previous section, with Table
13 identifying the 10 highest Indigenous population booths and their vote shares for
One Nation. The booths are in most cases in north Queensland, within the federal
electorates of Leichhardt, Herbert and Kennedy.
Given that state elections attract fewer candidates than state-wide Senate
elections, support for One Nation is higher across the board. However, the relative
weakness of support for the party in these booths is illustrated by comparing the
results with those in the column recording the total One Nation vote for the electorates
in which the booths were located. For the most part, these booths had median family
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income of less than $1000 and generally lower support for One Nation than booths
elsewhere in their electorates.

Table 16: Indigenous population and One Nation primary vote at 2017 Queensland state election

Booth

Electorate

ON Vote: ON Vote:

Indigenous

Median

Booth

Population

Weekly

Electorate

Income
(2016)

Cherbourg

Nanango

5.84%

27.4%

98.42%

$766

Yarrabah

Mulgrave

2.09%

22.3%

98.04%

$822

Napranum

Cook

7.21%

18.4%

95.47%

$770

Woorabinda

Gregory

5.02%

24.2%

94.39%

$716

Palm Island

Townsville

2.99%

19.9%

93.95%

$927

Hope Vale

Cook

7.24%

18.4%

92.95%

$745

Wujal

Cook

8.41%

18.4%

92.20%

$682

Aurukun

Cook

1.33%

18.4%

90.84%

$677

Kowanyama

Cook

2.26%

18.4%

90.68%

$841

Horn Island

Cook

8.18%

18.4%

89.74%

$1582

Half the booths in Table 13 are in the state electorate of Cook, where 36.4% of
residents identified as either Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander at the 2016 census
compared to 4% across Queensland and 2.8% nationally. It is established that Cook
is an outlier because the lower income areas did not vote One Nation, which is also
relevant to the corresponding federal electorate of Leichhardt. This point is illustrated
by Table 13, showing the result of a simple bivariate linear regression of the One
Nation vote and income levels for booths in Cook.

Table 17: Regression results for One Nation primary vote by polling booth in electorate of Cook at 2017
Queensland state election: median family income model

Model

Unstandardised B

Coefficients

Std. Sig.

Error

p value

(Constant)

.089

.048

.077

MFY2016

4.564E-5

.000

.228
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Contrary to the broader pattern, this shows income was in fact positively
associated with One Nation support within the electorate. Other state electorates that
experienced negative income growth, such as Mirani and Lockyer, appeared more
inclined to vote for One Nation for economic reasons. Based on the results from Cook,
there is further evidence that the association between economic voting and One
Nation does not apply to Aboriginal Australians.

5.2.4 Coal mining, economic decline and One Nation support
As noted in the beginning of the state election analysis, many of the election
issues during the campaign were economic in nature. While voters were concerned
about jobs, there was also controversy around the coal industry. The proposed Adani
coal mine in north Queensland was a contentious issue for the Labor government.
Environmental groups and the Greens argued that the government’s support for the
project showed it was weak on climate change action and was caving into climate
sceptics.13 Conversely, the mining industry claimed that building the Adani mine, along
with other infrastructure projects in Queensland, would create 10,000 new jobs directly
and indirectly.14
The statistically significant effects for change in income and unemployment are
consistent with election results showing One Nation performed well in areas that
experienced economic decline after 2011, in large part reflecting the downturn in the
mining industry. The electorate of Mackay was retained by Labor at the 2017 election,
but One Nation performed very strongly, recording 22.6% of the vote. The pattern is
typified by the Mackay South booth, covering an area that experienced 36% income
decline from $1694 in 2011 to $1073 in 2016, with unemployment nearly double the
state average at 14%. At the state election, 21% of the formal votes from this seat
went to One Nation.

5.3

CONCLUSION
In summary, this research points to an economic element in voting for One

Nation. This is a significant finding, given the view of Hellwig and McAllister that

Chris McCall, “Australia's New Coal Mine Plan: A ‘Public Health Disaster’,” The Lancet
10069, no. 389 (2017), 588.
14 McCall, 588.
13
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economic voting has been weak in Australia due to the short electoral cycle,
compulsory voting, party identification and assignment of responsibility for policy
outcomes.15 However, it may be notable that the evidence for income effects was
clearer at the federal election, perhaps reflecting a tendency of voters to attribute
responsibility for the economy to the federal government.
Particularly in regional Queensland, many voters on lower incomes suffered
from deteriorating economic conditions before the 2016 and 2017 elections, and these
areas turned strongly to One Nation. Although the findings from this study have found
the relationship between income and voting for One Nation to be statistically
significant, this was not relevant to Indigenous voters and those who spoke a language
other than English. Evidently, race and immigration were important factors entwined
in the party’s philosophy, but the economic insecurity felt by One Nation voters was a
notable factor in the party’s appeal.

15

Hellwig and McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter?” 237.
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusion
6.0

INTRODUCTION
In addressing the 2016-2017 rise in support for populist minor parties in

Australia, this thesis addresses three questions: whether economic voting can explain
this phenomenon; whether economic motivations could be better explained by
absolute measures of economic well-being or change in economic status; and whether
economic voting intersects with other voting factors. It concludes that both absolute
economic well-being and feelings of economic insecurity have played an important
role in boosting support for parties such as One Nation, but that these factors form an
inter-relationship with cultural concerns that limit the party’s support among non-white
voters.
Taken together, chapters one to four provide a basis for considering how
economic factors might explain the 2016 rise in support for One Nation. The first
chapter examined past research on why people vote for minor parties, in both Australia
and comparable jurisdictions. For much of Australia’s political history, significant minor
parties arose out of splits in the major parties or, in more recent decades, through the
rise of post-materialist politics with the Australian Democrats and later the Greens.
However, the further increase in minor party voting over this period has been achieved
by parties of the right such as One Nation, and by populist leaders such as Clive
Palmer, Jacqui Lambie and Bob Katter.
Chapter one considered whether the rise of populist parties and leaders was
due to cultural or economic factors. Populist parties and causes are often associated
with xenophobic tendencies and an emotional sentiment towards what the country
“used to be”. However, these attitudes can be rooted in economic concerns about job
security. The impact of globalisation and neoliberalism has been perceived as
negative for workers in manufacturing industries in western countries. These voters
may be turning to populist minor parties in an example of “reward-punishment” voting
against the major parties collectively.
The second chapter examined the early years of One Nation’s history. Pauline
Hanson rose to attention when she was disendorsed by the Liberal Party for her
comments against Aboriginal Australians during the 1996 election campaign. At the
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1998 Queensland state election, One Nation won 11 seats at the expense of both the
Nationals and Labor. The factors discussed in this chapter to explain the success of
One Nation were both economic and cultural, with the party’s voters tending to be
older, white, employed in blue-collar occupations and living in regional or outer urban
areas.
Chapter three further explored the economic circumstances in the lead-up to
the two elections studied in the thesis, and their potential to explain the rise in support
for populist minor parties. The most significant of these related to the downturn in the
mining industry in central and northern Queensland, an area of strong support for
Pauline Hanson and One Nation.
Chapter four was the main case study of this thesis. The chapter analysed the
connection between support for One Nation and the economic situation of the
surrounding area, in terms of family income and the unemployment rate. Given the
success of minor parties at the 2016 federal election, this provided an opportunity to
study the link between economic factors and minor party voting. While past literature
had indicated weak and inconsistent effects for economic voting in Australia, the aim
of this study was to provide a contemporary analysis on the topic in view of an
unprecedented rise in minor party voting over the course of the previous decade that
the existing focus on strength of party identification failed to fully explain.

6.1

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The aim of this research project was to consider if economic voting was a factor

in the rise in support for minor parties in recent electoral cycles in Australia, particularly
in relation to populist minor parties. This reached a peak with the Senate results from
the 2016 Australian federal election, at which One Nation won four seats (two in
Queensland, one in Western Australia and one in New South Wales). One Nation was
used a case study for economic voting, with a focus on the 2016 federal election and
the 2017 state election in Queensland.
Economic voting had previously been viewed as a weak concept in Australia
due to factors identified by Hellwig and McAllister: a short electoral cycle, compulsory
voting, party identification and assignment of responsibility for policy outcomes.1

Timothy Hellwig and Ian McAllister, “Does the Economy Matter? Economic Perceptions
and the Vote in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2016): 237.
1
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However, many hypotheses regarding the recent rise of right-wing populist parties
have been based on economic factors. Such hypotheses propose that voters have
become frustrated as their prosperity has declined, prompting opposition to policies
identified with the “globalisation” agenda that has been pursued in Australia with the
support of both the major parties.2
Conversely, it has been suggested that One Nation voters are primarily
motivated by cultural anxiety. An analysis on the topic by journalist and commentator
David Marr stated that Pauline Hanson had succeeded by tapping into fears about
race with her outspoken views on immigration, particularly around Muslim
immigration.3 However, fears of immigration are not created in a vacuum; they are
motivated by job insecurity and the scarcity of government services.4 The aim of this
thesis has been to gain an understanding of economic factors and the impact these
have had on the One Nation vote.
Based on the results from this study, there is evidence that economic factors
had a significant influence in many voters’ abandonment of the major parties. While
the party is notable for the concentration of its support in Queensland, the analysis of
national results from the 2016 Senate election indicated the relationship between
income and unemployment was relevant across the board. Under the rewardpunishment model, the voter would typically vote for the opposition if either their own
economic situation (pocketbook) or the national situation (sociotropic) had worsened.
By contrast, good financial management would typically be rewarded with re-election
of the incumbent government.5 However, in Australia recent election cycles have
shown that voters may instead be rejecting both established parties in favour of minor
parties.
Nevertheless, the relationship between economic voting and One Nation is not
applicable to all sections of the community. Areas with high populations of Aboriginal
Murray Goot, “Pauline Hanson’s One Nation: Extreme Right, Centre Party or Extreme
Left?” Labour History 89 (2005): 101.
3 David Marr, “The White Queen: One Nation and the Politics of Race,” The Quarterly Essay
65, 2017: 53.
4 Jordan McSwiney and Drew Cottle, “Unintended Consequences: One Nation and
Neoliberalism in Contemporary Australia,” Australian Journal of Political Economy 79
(2017): 96.
5 Timothy Hellwig, “Constructing Accountability: Party Position Taking and Economic
Voting,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 1 (2012): 92.
2
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and Torres Strait Islander people on low incomes, such as the Queensland state
electorate of Cook, did not translate to stronger results for One Nation. This exception
is likely to be linked to One Nation’s statements and policy positions on Indigenous
people, notably Pauline Hanson’s claim that Indigenous Australians received
preferential treatment over white Australians.
The distinctive behaviour of Indigenous communities illustrates the point that
cultural factors are important in determining support for One Nation, and that economic
factors cannot provide a complete explanation. This is also reflected in the divide
between city and country voting. The pattern at the 2016 federal and 2017 Queensland
elections was consistent in that the same areas were strong for One Nation at both
elections, especially in rural Queensland. Both elections also demonstrate that innercity areas are consistently weak for One Nation.

6.2

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND ONE NATION
In relation to the first research question, it was noted that the party identification

model of voter behaviour had been used to explain the weakness of economic voting
in previous decades. However, the results of the 2016 election were at odds with the
party identification model as there were increasing numbers of voters supporting minor
parties, despite Australian Election Study findings that voters are not forming strong
attachments to these parties.6 This raises the possibility that voting on short-term
assessments of the economic situation is becoming more important in the Australian
context and can be useful in explaining the rise of minor party voting.
The literature also shows that economic voting may occur even when the
economy is strong if voters believe they are falling behind the rest of the community.
Voters who reject the major parties may be motivated by either their real or perceived
economic circumstances. This is significant for the second of the three research
questions, which seeks to establish whether the economic motivations reflect absolute
levels of income or change over the preceding years. The statistical analysis in chapter
four thus included measures for change in income and unemployment over the five-

Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, “Trends in Australian Public Opinion: Results from the
Australian Election Study 1987-2016,” Australian National University, accessed 20
December 2020, https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/Trends-inAustralian-Political-Opinion-1987-2016.pdf.
6
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year period before the two elections, as well as overall measures of median income
and the unemployment rate.
Despite the uninterrupted economic growth Australia has experienced since the
early 1990s, many Australians have reported they have not benefited from the nation’s
prosperity. A 2018 survey by Community Pulse found 44% of respondents said they
had not gained anything from the last 26 years of economic growth.7 A majority of the
respondents believed those who gained the most in the last 26 years were large
corporations, senior executives, white collar workers and foreign investors. 8 This may
be a factor in explaining why some people vote for populist right-wing parties,
particularly if they have an anti-globalisation stance.
During Pauline Hanson’s initial period in parliament from 1996 to 1998, she
appealed to voters in rural Queensland and tapped into fear of unemployment and
regional economic decline. Despite economic prosperity, people feared their jobs
would be moved offshore, impacting both their own lives and those of their children.
Hanson targeted her campaign on economic factors that affected workers outside of
urban areas.9 Such a phenomenon was again illustrated by figures from the 2016
Australian Electoral Study series cited by David Marr. The results showed 68% of
respondents agreed their financial position in the last 12 months had either worsened
a little or a lot, and that this result remained consistent when respondents were asked
about the state of the economy. In comparison to other voters, One Nation supporters
were the most pessimistic about the economy.10
Support for One Nation appeared to be especially concentrated in areas that
had been hit by a downturn in the mining industry. This was demonstrated by the
results of the 2019 federal election in the four federal electorates with the highest share
of the workforce employed by coal mining: One Nation received 17.0% of the vote in
Capricornia, 17.5% in Flynn, 13.1% in Dawson and 21.6% in the New South Wales
seat of Hunter (the other three being in Queensland). This compares with a total of
Committee for Economic Developments of Australia, “Community Pulse 2018: The
Economic Disconnect,” accessed 14 April 2021,
https://www.ceda.com.au/ResearchAndPolicies/Research/Corporate-social-responsibility-ISocial-Compact/Community-pulse-2018-the-economic-disconnect.
8 Committee for Economic Developments of Australia.
9
Rachel Gibson, Ian McAllister, and Tami Swenson, “The Politics of Race and Immigration
in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 2
(2002): 826-830.
10 Marr, The White Queen, 53.
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8.0% out of the 59 lower house electorates that were contested by One Nation
candidates.
Debates during federal and Queensland state elections about the proposal by
Indian company Adani to build a coal mine in the Galilee Basin suggest these concerns
have been driven by a combination of economic and cultural factors. The Greens and
other environmental groups were against the project due to the environmental impacts
of coal mining, whereas supporters of the mine said it would create jobs at a time of
regional unemployment.11

6.3

CULTURAL ANXIETY, INDIGENOUS AND ETHNIC VOTING
While the results from the 2016 election suggest a significant effect for both

income and unemployment, it is evident that many other variables are required to
satisfactorily explain the growth in support for One Nation. For this reason, the
statistical analysis also includes variables for “speak English only” and the Indigenous
population. This is relevant to the third research question, relating to the intersection
between economic and other voting factors.
In each of the models, there was a highly significant statistical relationship
between the English-only population and One Nation support. At the state election,
One Nation support was inversely correlated with the size of the Indigenous
community, despite these communities having low incomes and high unemployment.
These results establish that economic influences on the level of One Nation support
occur within clear cultural boundaries, and that the party does not represent a protest
vote option for Indigenous voters and non-English speaking immigrants.
While some One Nation voters were primarily motivated by Hanson’s maverick
statements and profile in the media, her success also reflects underlying fear based
on cultural anxiety. As discussed in chapter one, a report on minor party voting by the
Grattan Institute found factors such as loss of personal status, concerns about
immigration and loss of community power had created the perception that the common

Chris McCall, “Australia's New Coal Mine Plan: A ‘Public Health Disaster’,” The Lancet
10069, no. 389 (2017), 588.
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voter had been left behind.12 Further, “Australia first” parties like One Nation appealed
to voters who responded to nostalgic appeals to the Australia of their childhood.13
Race is a factor in explaining why people vote for far-right parties, which also
correlates with economic factors. Far-right parties often exploit cultural anxieties by
arguing that the country’s way of life is being destroyed by people they perceive to be
alien to it. One Nation has frequently targeted voters opposed to policies that support
Indigenous people, as seen in Pauline Hanson’s maiden speech in 1996 and again
before the 2019 federal election, when she argued that Aboriginal people should be
required to prove their Indigenous ancestry when claiming some government
services.14
Evidently, Hanson’s controversial views are unpopular in Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander communities, which are marked by low incomes. This was
demonstrated in chapter four in the limitations of models based exclusively on income
and employment. Generally, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people earn less
money, as seen in the 2016 ABS data. Ordinarily there is a statistically significant
relationship between low income and support for One Nation, but an exception must
clearly be observed for those who are Indigenous or speak a language other than
English at home. This factor points to the limits of a purely income-based explanation
for One Nation support.
Like the Indigenous vote, areas that were multilingual recorded weaker support
for One Nation despite generally having low average incomes. This was evident in the
weak support for One Nation in the Sydney seats of Blaxland (1.84% Senate vote in
2019) and Watson (1.33%) and the Melbourne seats of Calwell (1.33%) and Hotham
(0.59%), despite them ranking in the lower third among electorates nationally for
median family income. Significantly, these electorates also ranked among the top
eleven for share of non-English speakers.15

Grattan Institute, “A Crisis of Trust,” accessed 15 November 2019,
https://grattan.edu.au/report/a-crisis-of-trust.
13 Grattan Institute.
14 SBS, “One Nation Wants Aboriginal People to 'Prove' Ancestry with DNA Tests,”
accessed 20 March 2019, https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2019/03/11/one-nationaboriginal-indigenous-dna.
15 These figures are based on 2016 census data adjusted for electoral boundaries at the 2019
federal election, are provided by election analyst, William Bowe.
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6.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS
In the literature review of this thesis, it was established that a gap exists in the

literature on economic voting in Australia, particularly in relation to declining support
for the major parties. Evidence in the Australian literature indicating weak economic
voting effects was based on electoral research conducted prior to increases in minor
party voting and was strongly influenced by Labor’s election wins at times of high
interest rates and unemployment in 1990 and 1993.
One possibility is that explanations for the weakness of economic voting in
Australia assumed two-party competition. However, bipartisan support for neoliberal
economic policies may have led dissatisfied voters to abandon the major parties
altogether. Another supposed limitation on economic voting was that Australian voters
mostly held international forces responsible for the state of the economy. This may not
apply to the rise of populist protest voting against globalisation, in which voters punish
the major parties collectively due to their joint responsibility for manufacturing jobs
going overseas, rather than alternating between them in the manner traditionally
understood by the reward-punishment model of economic voting.
Despite economic effects, the racial and cultural identity of a voter remains
important in determining support for One Nation. Voters are more inclined to vote for
One Nation if they are neither Indigenous nor speak a language other than English.
One Nation support in large part reflects cultural anxiety among white voters, which
the party exploits by positioning migrants as the source of social and economic
problems. However, the potential for these concerns to influence voter support for
populist minor parties such as One Nation varies according to specific economic
circumstances, which were clearly a factor in the pattern of support for the party at the
2016 federal and 2017 Queensland elections.

6.5

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study was based on Australian factors, there is the potential to compare

One Nation’s support base with other minor parties, particularly populist parties.
Comparing One Nation to other populist right-wing leaders (such as former President
Donald Trump) is not a realistic comparison given the establishment of the Republican
party. There is value in studying voter behaviour in a class context (within Australia).
While McAllister and Makkai’s study provided some insight into modern class voting,
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adding other variables (such as cultural engagement) to the study of minor party voters
could further the understanding of voter behaviour.
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